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ABSTRACT 
When it comes to the Arctic, there is no lack of planning, debating, 
studying, or shortage of opinions as to what the U.S. should or should not do in 
this region of extremes. Should the United States spend billions on icebreakers that 
when completed may not have ice to break, ignore the region and hope the rest of 
the world follows suit, or worse, militarize the region for an unknown future threat?      
Given the budget-constrained environment and lack of threat to the U.S. 
national security from the Arctic, is there another option or method to allow policy 
makers to envision a different future for the Arctic, one requiring them to wait and 
do nothing, knowing with some certainty that taking no action is the right decision at 
this moment in time?  
Using scenario planning, this thesis examines four future scenarios for the Arctic 
and evaluates the strategic patience and persistence strategy introduced in the 2015 
National Security Strategy to understand better the costs, risks, and benefits of doing little 
or nothing in the Arctic. Given the uncertainties in the Arctic and faced with greater 
threats to the homeland, the strategic patience and persistence strategy is a viable 
approach to pursue in the Arctic, which allows the U.S. to achieve its national Arctic 
goals.             
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In 1859, Russia offered to sell Alaska to the United States, hoping it would 
balance the power in the Pacific between them and Great Britain, and strengthen their 
relationship with the United States and bring about a “desirous of strengthening, if 
possible, the good understanding which exists between” the United States and Russia.1  
However, the Civil War prevented the United States from purchasing Alaska. The end of 
the Civil War brought a renewed interest in Alaska by then–Secretary of State William 
Seward. He negotiated the purchase and the United States took possession of Alaska in 
October 1867, and in 1959, Alaska became the 49th state. From 1867 until today, Alaska 
and more broadly the Arctic has been in and out of the news. Today, the Arctic is back in 
the news, but not for geopolitical reasons or the discovery of gold, oil, or other natural 
resources. Rather, the melting of the polar ice cap combined with an increased rate of 
melting drives what is taking place in the Arctic today.2  
When it comes to the Arctic, there is no lack of planning, debating, studying, or 
shortage of opinions as to what the U.S. should or should not do. The Arctic is 
increasingly becoming a homeland security issue because previously inaccessible areas 
are now accessible for exploration of natural resources, tourism, quicker shipping routes, 
                                                 
1 Digital History, “Alaska Treaty,” accessed November 13, 2017, 
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=4019. 
2 2017 Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA): Summary for Policy-makers, Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway; Fourth National Climate Assessment, 
Volume I [Wuebbles, D.J., D.W. Fahey, K.A. Hibbard, D.J. Dokken, B.C. Stewart, and T.K. Maycock 
(eds.)], U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, 303, doi: 10.7930/J00863GK. 
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and to non–blue water navies.3  The Arctic today “could become the source of 
cooperation that Seward foresaw.”4 
What strategy should the United States pursue in the Arctic?  This thesis sets out 
to answer this by assessing the costs, risks, and benefits of applying the strategic patience 
and persistence strategy for the Arctic. The 2015 National Security Strategy introduced 
this as an alternative to spending billions to upgrade communication systems, improve 
infrastructure and domain awareness, train and equip forces, and build Arctic-specific 
capabilities (e.g., polar-capable icebreaker).5 
From a policy perspective, the Arctic is guided by several national policies: 2009 
National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 
(NSPD 66/HSPD 25), 2015 National Security Strategy, 2013 National Strategy for the 
Arctic Region and the 2016 Implementation Framework for the National Strategy for the 
Arctic Region. Collectively, these policies, described as a “wish list,” lack direction, 
funding, or authority.6  I distilled from these three national strategic goals for the Arctic 
to assess the effectiveness of the strategic patience and persistence strategy. The three 
national strategic goals for the Arctic are 1) protect national security interests, 2) protect 
the homeland, and 3) ensure freedom of the seas. 
The thesis uses a modified “double uncertainty” matrix, also known as the “2x2 
matrix approach,” using scenarios representing four possible futures that I will use to 
                                                 
3 United States Geological Survey, Energy Resource Program, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal, 
http://energy.usgs.gov/RegionalStudies/Arctic.aspx.; Crystal Cruises, Northwest Passage, 
http://www.crystalcruises.com/voyage-finder/cruise-type/Region/northwest_passage.; Scott Borgerson, 
“Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming,” Foreign Affairs, 
March/April 2008, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/arctic-antarctic/2008-03-02/arctic-meltdown.; 
Andrea Charron, “Canada, the Arctic, and NORAD: Status quo or new ball game?,” International Journal, 
Vol. 70(2), (2015), 215-231; Blue water navies are those maritime forces that can operate globally, e.g. 
China, France, Italy, India, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States 
4 Scott G. Borgensen, “The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up,” Foreign 
Affairs, July/August 2013, accessed November 2, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/global-
commons/2013-06-11/coming-arctic-boom. 
5 The White House, “National Security Strategy,” February 2015, Washington, DC. 
6 William G. Dwyer, “The Evolving Arctic: Current State Of U.S. Arctic Policy,” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 17. 
 xvii
evaluate the strategic patience and persistence strategy.7  These scenarios incorporate the 
most important factor, Russia, with the most uncertain factor, the rate of melting ice in 
the Arctic. The titles for the four scenarios are New Spice Route, Arctic Renaissance, 
Sochi Agreement, and Arctic Russian Bear. The New Spice Route explores new trade 
routes through the Arctic. The Arctic Renaissance brings the Arctic out of the Ice Age 
into the 21st century. The Sochi Agreement is Russia’s second attempt at unifying 
nations around its strategic goals as attempted under the Warsaw Pact. Finally, the Arctic 
Russian Bear involves Russia flexing its military might to control the Arctic. The 
scenarios present policymakers four alternative futures where Russia’s actions either hold 
the Arctic region or world at risk (adversary role) or Russia aligns itself with other 
nations though various partnerships (partner role). At the same, I assess the impact the 
melting sea ice has on their and other nations’ actions.   
Strategies come in all shapes and sizes and across many disciplines. Military 
strategies include air superiority, blitzkrieg, flanking maneuvers and others. In business, 
typical strategies involve firms dominating their industry, monopolizing critical resources 
or out-innovating their competitors. According to Richard Rumelt in Good Strategy Bad 
Strategy: The Difference and Why It Matters, a good strategy recognizes the challenges, 
provides a way ahead, and typically has a “kernel” consisting of three elements: a 
diagnosis, guiding policy, and coherent action.8  Depending on whom you are, the 
strategic patience and persistence strategy may convey some or all of the following: a 
failure by leadership to define a hard and fast strategy; a willingness for flexibility and 
efficiency; acknowledgment of the unknown unknowns; or making a small investment 
now in hope of a greater return later. All of these have an eye toward keeping the nation’s 
powder dry until needed. 
With the scenarios and strategies in hand, I evaluate the costs, risks, and benefits 
of the United States pursuing the strategic patience and persistence strategy on its ability 
to protect its national security interests and the homeland and ensure freedom of the seas. 
                                                 
7 Muhammad Agar, Tugrul U. Daim and Anotnie Jetter, “A review of scenario planning,” Futures 
46(2013): 34, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2012.10.003. 
8 Richard P. Rumelt, Good Strategy Bad Strategy: the Difference and Why It Matters (Crown 
Business, 2011), loc 188 and 241 of 5141, Kindle. 
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In three of four scenarios, this strategy has acceptable risks; the fourth scenario entails the 
greatest risk and requires some action by the U.S. 
Today, the West views the melting Arctic sea ice with one eye on its risks and the 
other on its rewards. The risks entail impacts to the environment, indigenous people, and 
the climate. The rewards are quicker shipping routes, new areas for offshore oil, gas, and 
natural resource development, tourism, and more. Russia sees this as an opportunity to 
pivot away from Central Asia where it lost its foothold with the fall of the Iron Curtain 
and pursue a new course in the Arctic centered on four factors: foreign policy, military 
security, economic development, and transportation and maritime policy.9 
Scientists with a very high level of confidence predict “an Arctic-wide ice loss is 
expected to continue through the 21st century, very likely (>90%) resulting in nearly sea 
ice-free late summers by the 2040s.”10 Meanwhile, others are calling on the United States 
Coast Guard to buy four heavy icebreakers, with an average cost of $791 million and 
lifetime costs in excess of $6.5 billion, in lieu of three heavy and three medium 
icebreakers in the midst of a constrained budget environment.11   
While the Arctic may remain an area of little conflict or of homeland security 
concern for policymakers, the methods used in this thesis could assist them in evaluating 
future policy decisions as scenarios take an outside-in look at the future. Scenarios 
explore the problem space versus trying to predict it, and more importantly, they embrace 
the uncertainty of the future rather than dismissing it. Given these and other uncertainties, 
the strategic patience and persistence strategy is a viable approach to pursue in the Arctic, 
which allows the U.S. to achieve its national Arctic goals. 
                                                 
9 Caitlyn L. Antrim, “The Russian Arctic in the Twenty-First Century,” in Arctic Security in an Age of 
Climate Change, ed. James Kraska, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 120-124. 
10 Taylor, P.C., W. Maslowski, J. Perlwitz, and D.J. Wuebbles, 2017: Arctic Changes and their Effects 
on Alaska and the Rest of the United States, 303; “Very high level of confidence” is defined as “Strong 
evidence (established theory, multiple sources, consistent results, well documented and accepted methods, 
etc.), high consensus.” 
11 Ben Werner, “Report: Coast Guard Should Focus on Buying Heavy Icebreakers,” USNI News, 
November 20, 2017, accessed November 25, 2017, https://news.usni.org/2017/11/20/report-coast-guard-
focus-heavy-icebreakers; National Academy of Science, Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: 
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In 1859, Russia offered to sell Alaska to the United States hoping it would 
balance the power in the Pacific between Russia and Great Britain. However, the Civil 
War prevented the United States from purchasing Alaska. The end of the U.S. Civil War 
brought a renewed interest in Alaska by then Secretary of State William Seward who was 
“desirous of strengthening, if possible, the good understanding which exists between” the 
United States and Russia.1  He negotiated the purchase and the United States took 
possession of Alaska in October 1867.     
For the next thirty years the U.S. government all but ignored Alaska, so much so, 
the purchase was dubbed “Seward’s Folly,” until gold was discovered in 1896. Alaska’s 
strategic importance would again go into hibernation until World War II during the Battle 
of the Aleutians, and in 1959, Alaska became the 49th state.2   
Alaska was put on the map in 1967 with the discovery of oil in Prudhoe Bay and 
with it came a construction boom building the Alaskan pipeline and infrastructure to 
support the oil industry.3  As happened before, interest in Alaska and more broadly the 
Arctic waned. It was not until 2010 when former President Obama included a sentence on 
“Arctic Interest” in the 2010 National Security Strategy making the Arctic part of the 
Nation’s strategic policy.4  Prior to this, the Arctic and Antarctica policies resided in one 
policy document.5   
                                                 
1 Digital History, “Alaska Treaty,” accessed November 13, 2017, 
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=4019. 
2 United States Department of State.  Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1866-1898, Purchase of 
Alaska, 1867,” November 17, 2016, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/alaska-purchase. 
3 Alaskan Oil Production 1959-2010, accessed October 31, 2007, 
http://www.tax.alaska.gov/sourcesbook/AlaskaProduction.pdf.; Alaska Humanities Forum: Alaska History 
& Cultural Studies, “Modern Alaska – Oil Discovery and Development in Alaska,” November 17, 2016, 
http://www.akhistorycourse.org/modern-alaska/oil-discovery-and-development-in-alaska.  
4 The White House, “National Security Strategy,” May 2010, Washington, DC, 50. 
5 The White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-26, “United States Policy on the Arctic and 
Antarctic,” June 9, 1994. 
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Today, the Arctic is back in the news, not for geopolitical reasons or the discovery 
of gold, oil, or other natural resource. Rather, the relatively recent melting of the polar ice 
cap, first identified in the 1970s and 1980s, and the increase rate of melting drives what is 
taking place in the Arctic today. From 2011 to 2017, forecasts for a “nearly sea ice-free 
late summer” went from occurring in 2050 to the 2040s to possibly the late 2030s.6  The 
Arctic is increasingly becoming a homeland security issue because previously 
inaccessible areas are now accessible for exploration of natural resources, tourism, 
quicker shipping routes, and to non-blue water navies.7  The Arctic today “could become 
the source of cooperation that Seward foresaw.”8 
A. PROBLEM SPACE 
1. Background 
When it comes to the Arctic, there is “no failure to plan,” especially for   
Washington which equates evaluating, studying, and debating the Arctic’s strategic role, 
year after year, “as equivalent to taking decisions on a future course of action.”9  The 
                                                 
6 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), 2011 Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the 
Arctic (SWIPA): Climate Change and the Cryosphere, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 
(AMAP), Oslo, Norway, viii; Taylor, P.C., W. Maslowski, J. Perlwitz, and D.J. Wuebbles, 2017: Arctic 
Changes and their Effects on Alaska and the Rest of the United States, In: Climate Science Special Report: 
Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume I [Wuebbles, D.J., D.W. Fahey, K.A. Hibbard, D.J. Dokken, 
B.C. Stewart, and T.K. Maycock (eds.)], U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, 303, 
doi: 10.7930/J00863GK; Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), 2017 Snow, Water, Ice and 
Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA): Summary for Policy-makers, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway, 5; National Snow and Ice Data Center, “Climate Change in the 
Arctic,” https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/arctic-meteorology/climate_change.html 
7 United States Geological Survey, Energy Resource Program, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal, 
http://energy.usgs.gov/RegionalStudies/Arctic.aspx.; Crystal Cruises, Northwest Passage, 
http://www.crystalcruises.com/voyage-finder/cruise-type/Region/northwest_passage.; Scott Borgerson, 
“Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming,” Foreign Affairs, 
March/April 2008, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/arctic-antarctic/2008-03-02/arctic-meltdown.; 
Andrea Charron, “Canada, the Arctic, and NORAD: Status quo or new ball game?,” International Journal, 
Vol. 70(2), (2015), 215-231; Blue water navies are those maritime forces that can operate globally, e.g. 
China, France, Italy, India, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States. 
8 Scott G. Borgensen, “The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up,” Foreign 
Affairs, July/August 2013, accessed November 2, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/global-
commons/2013-06-11/coming-arctic-boom. 
9 Opening comments by Representative John Garamendi (CA-3) at the July 12, 2016 Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, accessed January 14, 2017, 16:08, https://youtu.be/WjJz_rZErsE; 
Heather Conley, A New Security Architecture for the Arctic, An American Perspective, (Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), 18. 
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Nation’s policies and implementation plans start from the White House and include a 
dozen Federal Departments and Agencies, numerous Federal interagency committees and 
state level agencies.10  Critics of the latest Arctic strategies, 2015 National Security 
Strategy and 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, call it a list of challenges with 
no priorities, no “future capability needs,” and no budgetary plan.11   
What defines the Arctic region depends on whom you ask. Generally, scientists 
and aviators define the Arctic as the area north of the Arctic Circle (66° 34’ N). 
Ecologists define it as the area north of the tree line with frozen ground and sparse 
vegetation. Climatologists use the 10º Isotherm line, where the average summer 
temperature does not go above 10º C (50º F). Anthropologists define it by the societies 
that have adapted to the Arctic.12  The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 
(AMAP), one of the six working groups of the Arctic Council, has a broader definition: 
“the terrestrial and marine areas north of the Arctic Circle (66°32’ N), and north of 62° N 
in Asia and 60° N in North America, modified to include the marine areas north of the 
Aleutian chain, Hudson Bay, and parts of the North Atlantic Ocean including the 
Labrador Sea.”13  Lastly, the U. S. government defines the Arctic in 15 USC § 4111 as:  
All United States and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all 
United States territory north and west of the boundary formed by the 
Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including 
the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the 
Aleutian chain.14   
                                                 
10 “DOD Expects to Play a Supporting Role to Other Federal Agencies and Has Efforts Under Way to 
Address Capability Needs and Update Plans” (GAO-15-566) (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2015), 12 http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-566. 
11 Robert D. Blackwell and Janine A. Davidson, “Media Call: The 2015 National Security Strategy,” 
Council on Foreign Relations, February 10, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/grand-strategy/media-call-2015-
national-security-strategy/p36117; Michaela David, “U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region: Strong 
Foothold or Thin Ice,” The Arctic Institute, May 13, 2013, accessed November 6, 2017, 
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/us-national-strategy-for-arctic-region/. 
12 National Snow and Ice Data Center, “What is the Arctic,” accessed July 14, 2017, 
https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/arctic-meteorology/arctic.html. 
13 Janine L. Murray, Louwrens Hacquebord, Dennis J. Gregor, and Harald Loeng, 
“Physical/Geographical Characteristics of the Arctic,” in AMAP Assessment Report: Arctic Pollution, ed. 
Janine L. Murray (Oslo, 1998), 10.    
14 15 USC § 4111. 
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This thesis will use the 15 USC § 4111 when talking about the Arctic. Figures 1–3 
depict the various Arctic definitions. 
 
Figure 1. Map of the Arctic depicting some of the Arctic definitions.15 
                                                 
15 Arctic Studies Program, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), accessed July 14, 
2017, http://arcticstudies.pbworks.com/w/page/13623280/AMAP.  
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Figure 2. Arctic indigenous people16 
 
 
Figure 3. Arctic as defined by 15 USC § 4111 
                                                 
16 Encyclopedia Britannica, “Aleut,” accessed July 19, 2017, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Aleut. 
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The Arctic is an area of extremes–continuous daylight during the summer months 
and darkness during winter; temperatures at Barrow exceeding 60º Fahrenheit in the 
summer to minus 40º Fahrenheit in the winter; and periods when the sea ice makes travel 
nearly impossible. It encompasses 24 time zones, 4 million people from eight different 
nations, and 40 different ethnic groups. Unlike Antarctica, the Arctic is an ocean, albeit 
frozen at various places and times, surrounded by three continents.17  These extremes 
have not dissuaded exploration or research in the Arctic, which dates back to the time of 
the Vikings with modern explorations by Willem Barents (1594-1597), Henry Hudson 
(1607-1610), James Cook (1776-1779), and William Parry (1820s) to the first nuclear 
submarine, USS Prago (1993-1998) and others.18 
Limited infrastructure and vast distances add to the Arctic’s extremes. Barrow 
(pop 4,429), the largest U.S. city on the north slope of Alaska is accessible only by air 
and sea.19  By comparison, the largest Russian city, Murmansk (pop 305,000), is on the 
verge of completing its Murmansk Transportation Hub consisting of roads, railways, 
ports, and other facilities and serves as the western hub of the Northern Sea Route 
(NSR).20  Dutch Harbor is the only deep-water port in Alaska, which requires deep draft 
vessels to anchor offshore when supplying cities north of the Bering Strait.21  Due to its 
higher latitude, there is limited/degraded communication (radio, satellite, and cellular 
networks) in the Arctic.22  Despite these extremes, the United States Geological Survey 
                                                 
17 Arctic Council, “Arctic People,” accessed January 15, 2017, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/our-work/arctic-peoples, and Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, “Arctic 
Indigenous Peoples, accessed October 29, 2017, 
http://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/communications/arcticregion/Arctic-Indigenous-Peoples. 
18 Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Polar Discovery, “The Arctic: Exploration Timeline,: 
accessed January 14, 2017, http://polardiscovery.whoi.edu/arctic/1993.html. 
19 The City of Barrow, accessed January 14, 2017, http://www.cityofbarrow.org/index.php/about-
barrow. 
20 Welcome to Russia, Murmansk city, Russia, accessed January 15, 2017, 
http://russiatrek.org/murmansk-city; “Huge Implications of Russia’s Northern Sea Route. An Alternative to 
the Suez Canal?,” Hellenic Shipping News, November 27, 2017, accessed November 27, 2017, 
http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/huge-implications-of-russias-northern-sea-route-an-alternative-to-
the-suez-canal/. 
21 United States Coast Guard, Arctic Strategy, Washington,, DC (May 2013), 14. 




(USGS) reports the Arctic may contain the world’s largest unexplored areas of petroleum 
and another 44 billion barrels of undiscovered natural gas reserves.23  
As there is no lack of planning, debating, or studying the Arctic, there is also no 
shortage of opinions as to what the U.S. should or should not do:  
 Retired Rear Admiral Akimoto speculated as more of the Arctic polar ice 
melts, it would free up the Arctic Ocean to increase naval presence and 
power projections. This would then ignite a new cold war and overturn 
previous conventional wisdom, assumption, and strategy that the Arctic is 
an impenetrable sea route.24   
 Others concur with Admiral Akimoto and urge the United States to set 
aside its neglect of the Arctic and if nothing else, “establish a greater 
maritime presence.”25   
 The United States should seek to demilitarize the Arctic through 
diplomatic means, by either leveraging existing relationships with North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or collaborating with the public 
and private sectors.26 
 The Arctic presents the world a once in a lifetime opportunity to learn 
from previous mishaps and “to rewrite the rules of the game for 
developing a frontier economy,” which if done properly is a win for the 
environment, the global economy, and indigenous people who call the 
Arctic home.27   
 Finally, a Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations 
studied the Arctic from four broad areas: U.S. Policy, National Security, 
Economic, Energy and Environmental Interests, and Alaska and Alaskan 
Natives and concluded the Arctic is at a major turning point requiring the 
                                                 
23 USGS Undiscovered oil resources in the Federal portion of the 1002 Area of the Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge: an economic update, accessed January 14, 2017, 
https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2005/1217/pdf/2005-1217.pdf; additional studies found at 
https://energy.usgs.gov/RegionalStudies/Arctic.aspx. 
24 RADM (Retired) Kazumine Akimoto, “Power Games in the Arctic Ocean,” October 20, 2009, 
accessed January 15, 2017, http://www.institutenorth.org/assets/images/uploads/files/Power.pdf. 
25 Packard C. Trent, “An evaluation of the Arctic—will it become an area of cooperation or conflict?,” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 92.  
26 Brandon J. Daigle and Brian W. James, “Assessing the Strategic Utility of the High North: The 
Colder War,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 59-64. 
27 Borgensen, “The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up.” 
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United States to embark on new investments to ensure our national 
interests and security.28  
From a Homeland Security perspective, given the other threats the United States 
faces–terrorism, violent extremism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
transnational organized crime, and cyberattacks–the Arctic is a stable region despite 
ongoing disputes depicted in Figure 4. However, as we will see next, the national 
strategies, policies, and goals for the Arctic are a series of disjointed publications, which 
adds to the problem space.    
                                                 
28 Thad W. Allen and Christine Todd Whitman, Independent task force report: Vol. 75. Arctic 
Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on America's Fourth Coast, New York, NY: Council on Foreign 
Relations.  
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Figure 4. Ongoing Arctic disputes29 
2. National Goals for the Arctic 
We have an awakening at the national level -- that we have got to pay 
attention to what’s happening in the Arctic... What is our strategic 
approach?  Is it going to be the next military campaign, or is it going to 
                                                 
29 “Geopolitique de l’Arctique: la course pour les ressources”, 19 October 2007, by Philippe 
Rekacewicz, Monde Diplomatique from Roderick Kefferpütz, "On thin ice? (Mis)interpreting Russian 
policy in the high north", CEPS Policy Brief no. 205, 2010. 
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[be] working among coast guards, looking at rising sea levels, northern 
migrations of fish stocks?30 
The above quote by Admiral Zukunft may lead the reader to believe the United 
States has either no national strategy for the Arctic or one not suited for today’s Arctic 
environment. Commander William Dwyer’s Naval Postgraduate School thesis, describes 
the Nation’s Arctic policy, as a “wish list” that lacks direction, funding, or authority.31  
The following explores the development of the major national strategy, policies, and 
goals for the Arctic; Appendix A contains a complete list of the U.S. national Arctic 
policies.   
Implemented in 1994, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-26–United States 
Policy on the Arctic and Antarctic Regions (PDD-26) recognized the need for leadership 
and international cooperation in the Arctic and Antarctica, while at the same time it 
acknowledged the differences between the two regions. PDD-26 established six 
objectives for the Arctic and four for Antarctica. Written at the end of the Cold War, 
PDD-26 recognized new opportunities for cooperation with Russia, allowing the United 
States to shift its emphasis in the Arctic from traditional threats to environmental, 
biological and natural resource issues, while maintaining “peace and stability in the 
region.”32 
Fifteen year later, the 2009 National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 25 (NSPD 66/HSPD 25)–Arctic Region Policy replaced 
PDD-26 and was the country’s first Arctic specific national policy; PDD-26 remains the 
Nation’s policy for Antarctic. Although NSPD 66/HSPD 25’s policies are similar to those 
in PDD-26 (see Appendix A), it did establish three policy elements with a defense/
homeland security nexus: “National Security and Homeland Interests in the Arctic,” 
“Maritime Transportation in the Arctic,” and “Environmental Protection and 
                                                 
30 Comment made by Admiral Paul Zukunft, Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, The 
Wilson Center – Arctic Circle Forum, Key Quotes from Keynote Speakers, accessed October 6, 2017, 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/day-1-the-wilson-center-arctic-circle-forum.  
31 William G. Dwyer, “The Evolving Arctic: Current State Of U.S. Arctic Policy,” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 17. 
32 The White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC – PDD 26, “United States Policy on the 
Arctic and Antarctic Regions, June 9, 1994, 2-5. 
 11
Conservation of Natural Resources.”33  Each policy element is co-chaired by multiple 
Departments and Agencies. Implementation plans include broad statements–project sea 
power, exercise sovereignty, establish a risk-based capability to address hazards due to 
increased presence of people, and a risk-based approach based on the best available 
information as the means to protect the environment and natural resources.34  Despite 
their similarities, the creation of a separate national strategy for the Arctic separate from 
Antarctica recognizes the uniqueness, challenges, and opportunities of both regions.   
In 2010 and again in 2015, then President Barack Obama released the National 
Security Strategy. The 2010 National Security Strategy mentions the Arctic in one 
sentence prior to the conclusion. 
The United States is an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental 
interests in the Arctic region, where we seek to meet our national security 
needs, protect the environment, responsibly manage resources, account for 
indigenous communities, support scientific research, and strengthen 
international cooperation on a wide range of issues.35   
In the 2015 National Security Strategy, the Arctic appears in three sections: 
“Climate Change,” “Air and Maritime Security,” and “Advance our Energy Security.”36  
Given the threats and challenges facing the U.S. at this time, the Arctic is a footnote to 
defeating al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, improving our relationship with China, India, and 
Russia, reducing the spread of nuclear weapons and preventing cybersecurity threats.37 
Calling the Arctic “one of our planet’s last great frontiers,” the 2013 National 
Strategy for the Arctic Region identified “three lines of effort: Advance United States 
Security Interest, Pursue Responsible Arctic Region Stewardship and Strengthen 
International Cooperation.”38  These three lines of effort (LOEs) follow four guiding 
principles: “Safeguard Peace and Stability, Make Decisions Using the Best Available 
                                                 
33 White House, National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
25 (NSPD-66/HSPD-25), “Arctic Region,” January 9, 2009, 1-14.   
34 Ibid., 12-13. 
35 “National Security Strategy,” May 2010, 50. 
36 The White House, “National Security Strategy,” February 2015, Washington, DC., 12, 13, and 16. 
37 Idid., 1, 3, and 27. 
38 White House, National Strategy for the Arctic Region, Washington, D.C. (May 10, 2013), i and 2. 
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Information, Pursue Innovative Arrangements, and Consult and Coordinate with Alaska 
Natives.”39  Unlike other strategic documents, which fall short on details, that is not the 
case for the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region. In 2014, the Arctic Executive 
Steering Committee (AESC) released the Implementation Framework for the National 
Strategy for the Arctic Region (Framework); the AESC updated the Framework in 2016. 
Beginning with the 2014 Framework and continuing with the 2016 version, the 
Framework identifies “specific actions supported by programs overseen by Federal 
entities” for the three LOEs. LOE 1, “Advance U.S. Security Interests,” and three 
actionable programs from LOE 3, “Strengthen International Cooperation,” apply to this 
thesis.40  LOE 1 states the highest priority for the Federal Government is “protecting the 
American people, our sovereign territory and rights, and the natural resources and other 
interests of the United States.”41  The National Security Council (NSC) coordinates 
efforts for LOE 1, which has eight actionable programs. The Department of State 
coordinates LOE 3 and as experts debate the usefulness of the Arctic Council’s 
governance; at the heart of LOE 3 is cooperation and not conflict..42 Going it alone in the 
Arctic may display the Arctic’s pioneering spirit, but this is often fraught with unforeseen 
challenges and pitfalls. In the Arctic there are few, if any, issues affecting a single 
country. See Appendix B for details on LOEs 1 and 3.    
There are a couple other documents of note. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty along with 
the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources and the 
1991 Environmental Protection Protocol established an international framework ensuring 
Antarctica remains a “zone of peace and international cooperation”43  No similar treaty or 
international conventions/protocols exists for the Arctic. Finally, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) replaced four 1958 treaties and went into 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 2-3. 
40 Arctic Executive Steering Committee, “Implementation Framework for the National Strategy for the 
Arctic Region,” Washington, D.C. (March 2016), 3. 
41 Ibid., 5. 
42 Douglas C. Nord, “The Challenge of Arctic Governance,” Wilson Quarterly, Summer 2017, 
accessed October 8, 2017, https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/into-the-arctic/the-challenge-of-
arctic-governance/. 
43 Ibid., 5 and PDD-26, 5. 
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effect in 1994. Although the United States ratified the four 1958 treaties that formed the 
basis for UNCLOS, the United States has yet to ratify UNCLOS, but follows it as a 
matter of customary international law.44  UNCLOS provides a legal framework for 
commercial and military shipping and use of natural resources within the world’s oceans. 
Support for UNCLOS includes both sides of the aisle in Congress, Secretaries of State 
from both parties and the military service chiefs.45  However, those for and against 
ratifying UNCLOS have valid points as to why the United States should or should not 
ratify it. I believe the U.S. should ratify UNCLOS, however, as U.S. policy makers 
debate the pros and cons of UNCLOS, other Arctic and non-Arctic nations have asserted 
their rights in the Arctic, with the United States increasingly finding itself at a 
considerable disadvantage in the Arctic regarding legal rights and limitations for energy 
exploration, telecommunication cables, and national security issues.46  By contrast, all the 
other Arctic Council nations ratified UNCLOS, along with some 150 other countries.47  
UNCLOS serves as the foundation for their Arctic Policy, which in turn provides a 
common framework for other issues in the Arctic. As more and more of the polar ice cap 
melts, the Arctic is becoming the 21st century’s space race; some speculate that unless the 
United States takes a greater leadership role, other countries will begin to dictate the rules 
for this new race.48   
3. Summary 
NSPD 66/HSPD 25, the 2015 National Security Strategy and the 2013 National 
Strategy for the Arctic Region along with its Implementation Plan form the basis of the 
                                                 
44 William Gallo, “Why hasn’t the US Signed the Law of Sea Treaty,” Voice of America, June 6, 
2016, http://www.voanews.com/a/united-states-sign-law-sea-treaty/3364342.html 
45 Stewart Patrick, “(Almost) Everyone Agrees: The U.S. Should Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty,” 
The Atlantic, June 10, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/-almost-everyone-
agrees-the-us-should-ratify-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty/258301/.   
46 Allen and Whitman, “Arctic Imperatives – Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on the America’s Fourth 
Coast.” 
47 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,. Annex II, Commission on the limits of the 
Continental Shelf, 1982, Article 76, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements 
/texts/unclos/annex2.htm.   
48 Josh Rogin, “Who is in Charge of Arctic Policy?” Foreign Policy, May 7, 2010. 
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/07/who_s_in_charge_of_arctic_policy. 
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national Arctic policies for the United States today. From these foundational documents, 
specific Federal Executive Departments and Agencies, and others developed their Arctic 
policies.  
Based on the above foundational documents, I will use the following strategic 
national Arctic goals to assess the effectiveness of the strategic patience and persistence 
strategy with respect to the four scenarios presented in Chapter V: 
 Protect national security interests–these include unilateral or coalition 
operations across the spectrum of operations (see Figure 5) in order to 
deter war, terrorist attacks, and criminal acts using all means of national 
power (diplomacy, information, military and economics).49 
 Protect the homeland–ensure safety and security of the American people 
through secure borders and enforcement of laws; protect the environment 
by “balancing environmental concerns with economic and national 
security priorities.”50   
 Ensure freedom of the sea–the Arctic is primarily a maritime domain 
currently with three shipping routes: the Northwest Passage (NWP), the 
NSR, and the Arctic Bridge Route and one future route Transpolar Sea 
Route (TSR), depicted in Figure 6. Freedom of the seas allows the U.S. to 
project sea power, ensures movement of people and commerce and 
provides the ability to respond to emergencies and incidents.51 
 
                                                 
49 Frank Hoffman, Ph.D., “The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, 
Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War,” The Heritage Foundation, accessed October 9, 2017, 
http://index.heritage.org/military/2016/essays/contemporary-spectrum-of-conflict/ and Spectrum of 
Conflict, accessed October 9, 2017, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Images/jfq/jfq-75/torruella-
figure1.jpg.  
50 Borgensen, “The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up.” 
51 NSPD-66/HSPD-25, 3-4, 9, 12-13. 
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Figure 5. Spectrum of operations – Disaster relief to nuclear war52 
                                                 
52 Source: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Images/jfq/jfq-75/torruella-figure1.jpg. 
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Figure 6. Arctic shipping routes53 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What strategy should the United States pursue in the Arctic?  The Arctic is 
currently a region posing little threat to U.S. national security yet policy makers continue 
to evaluate, study, and debate the Arctic’s strategic role in lieu of making a decision in a 
budget-constrained environment.54  This thesis assesses the costs, risks, and benefits of 
applying the strategic patience and persistence as a strategy for the Arctic. The 2015 
National Security Strategy introduced this as an alternative to spending billions to 
upgrade communication systems, improve infrastructure and domain awareness, train and 
equip forces, and build Arctic specific capabilities (e.g., polar capable icebreaker).55  I 
will explore this strategy in general and specifics in Chapter IV.     
                                                 
53 Source: http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/Arctic-Shipping-is-Not-Chinas-New-Silk-Road-
2014-02-14. 
54 Heather Conley, A New Security Architecture for the Arctic, An American Perspective, 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), 18. 
55 “National Security Strategy,” February 2015, ii. 
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C. THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter II is a survey of the literature concerning the Arctic using five broad 
categories: climate change; air and maritime safety; energy security; diplomacy; and 
homeland security. The first three categories are from 2015 National Security Strategy 
while the last two cover overarching Arctic issues.  
This thesis develops and assesses four different scenarios as its method.  
Chapter III, provides an overview of the scenario method, namely how it differs from 
models, simulations and games. Scenarios view the future not as a continuum of the 
present day but one with unlimited possibilities not constrained by our experiences, 
emotions, and expectations. I used an 8-step process to develop the four scenarios.   
Chapter IV provides an overview of the strategic patience and persistence strategy 
by examining other wait-and-see strategies as well as critiques of this strategy.   
Chapter V begins by examining key nations, issues, and factors affecting the 
future of the Arctic. Next, I develop four plausible future scenarios for the Arctic and 
determine if the U.S. can achieve the three national Arctic strategy goals using the 
strategic patience and persistence strategy.   
Chapter VI analyzes each of the scenarios for their qualitative effectiveness to 
achieve the U.S. national security interests in the Arctic using three categories: costs, 
risks, and benefits.      
Chapter VII concludes the thesis with a wrap-up, recommendations for policy 
makers and areas for future study. 
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The literature reviewed is from a wide range of sources–U.S. and foreign 
government websites, professional journals, intergovernmental agencies, think tanks and 
media reports. It examines the current homeland security policies affecting the Arctic and 
uses as its framework the 2015 National Security Strategy, which identifies three broad 
areas of interest for the Arctic:  Climate Change, Air and Maritime Security and Energy 
Security.56  Additionally, the review looks at diplomatic and homeland security policies 
and issues affecting the Arctic.  
The United States is an Arctic nation because of Alaska. Other Arctic nations 
have a greater Arctic presence–Canada has over 160,000 miles of coastline in the Arctic, 
by comparison, Alaska has 6,400 miles–and their policies are more comprehensive and 
unified when compared to the United States.57  This split in policy is across all three 
areas—Climate Change, Air and Maritime Safety, and Energy Security. A common 
theme in the literature is the United States having a “domestic and foreign” Arctic 
policy.58         
Differing geographic terms within the literature add confusion when discussing 
the Arctic. The Arctic is a region when viewed through NSPD 66/HSPD 25–Arctic 
Region Policy. Within the National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan Council, the 
Arctic is a body of water lumped together with the Great Lakes. From Department of 
Defense (DOD) perspective, the Arctic is a multi-domain geographical area under the 
56 “National Security Strategy,” February 2015, The White House, Washington, D.C., 12, 13 and 16. 
57 Fly Alaska, Interesting Facts about Alaska, accessed November 15, 2018, 
http://www.flyalaska.com/alaskafacts.html. 
58 Philip E. Steinberg, “Maintaining hegemony at a distance: ambivalence in US Arctic policy,” in 
Polar Geopolitics?: Knowledges, Resources and Legal Regimes, ed: Richard C. Powell and Klaus Dodds 
(MA: Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2014), 113-130. 
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Command and Control of two Combatant Commanders (U.S. Northern Command and 
U.S. European Command).59   
B. DIPLOMATIC
When looking at policies affecting the Arctic, one might be tempted to restrict this 
to just U. S. policies, directives, laws and the like. However, the Arctic is not a nation-
state, which the United States can negotiate treaties, trade agreements, security issues, 
etc. Rather it is a geographical area encompassing the territory of five countries Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States–commonly known as 
the Arctic Five, governed by the Arctic Council.60   
The Arctic Council is the “preeminent intergovernmental forum for addressing 
issues related to the Arctic” and consists of three groups. Member States are the sole 
decision makers for the Arctic Council whose Chairmanship rotates every two years 
between Member States; these include the Arctic Five plus Finland, Iceland, and Sweden. 
Permanent Participants have full consultation rights and come from six international 
organizations representing over 500,000 indigenous people. Finally, Observer status is 
open to non-Arctic countries and select organizations, currently thirteen countries are 
Observers to the Arctic Council.61  The Arctic Council is in a sense a mini-United 
Nations, with each Arctic nation advocating for its own national interest, which at times 
may conflict with the U.S.   
There is almost universal agreement the United States’ national Arctic polices are 
woefully inadequate.62  This unpreparedness is not limited to the United States but also 
extends to the European Union (EU) and NATO and seems likely to remain this way with 
59 Marcus Weisgerber, “Congress Will Rethink Combatant Command Boundaries,” Defense One, 
February 25, 2016. 
60 Ibid., 15 U.S.C. 4111.; Eye on the Arctic, “Blog: The Return of the Arctic Five,” accessed 
November 12, 2016, http://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2015/07/23/blog-the-return-of-the-arctic-five/. 
61 United States Department of State, Diplomacy in Action, Arctic Council, accessed November 18, 
2016,“ http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/ac/.” 
62 Dwyer, “The Evolving Arctic: Current State of U.S. Arctic Policy,” 2. 
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the new administration.63  There are a variety of policies within the Executive 
Departments and Agencies, each approaching the Arctic through their own lens: DOD–
defense and security; National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration–stewardship and 
scientific data collection; United States Coast Guard (USCG) –maritime awareness, 
partnerships, modernization, and so forth–with little or no synchronization between the 
Departments and Agencies.64  This approach provides redundancy and adaptiveness, but 
at an increase in costs as this is an uncoordinated effort.   
C. CLIMATE CHANGE
The 2015 National Security Strategy identified climate change as “an urgent and 
growing threat to our national security.”65  A large volume of the literature on the topic 
focused on politicians, scientists, and activists debating the science, or lack of it, around 
climate change. Former President Obama made climate change a cornerstone of his 
administration.66  Scientists have little to no doubt about the climatic changes taking 
place in the Arctic today, but notwithstanding this, there is a political debate about this 
issue that might influence U.S. policy regarding the Arctic.67  While United States policy 
makers debate the merits of the science behind global warming, other countries are 
63 European Union, External Action, EU Arctic Policy, June 15, 2016, accessed January 1, 2017, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/418/eu-arctic-policy_en.; Coffey, Luke and 
Daniel Kochis, “NATO Summit 2016: Time for an Arctic Strategy 2016,” The Heritage Foundation, June 
16, 2016, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/06/nato-summit-2016-time-for-an-arctic-strategy; 
Breum, Martin, “Trump, Thule and America’s uncertain Arctic Future”, The Arctic Journal, November 18, 
2016, http://arcticjournal.com/politics/2708/trump-thule-and-americas-uncertain-arctic-future; Joël Plouffe, 
U.S. Arctic Foreign Policy in the Era of President Trump: A Preliminary Assessment, Canadian Global 
Affairs Institute (Calgary, CA), November 2017, 1. 
64 United States. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. NOAA's Arctic Vision & Strategy 
([Silver Spring, Md.?]: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2010).; “United States Coast 
Guard Arctic Strategy,” United States Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C., (May 2013). 
65 “National Security Strategy,” February 2015, 12. 
66 Barack Obama, Climate Change and President Obama’s Action Plan, accessed December 29, 2016, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/president-obama-climate-action-plan. 
67 Taylor, P.C., W. Maslowski, J. Perlwitz, and D.J. Wuebbles, 2017: Arctic Changes and their Effects 
on Alaska and the Rest of the United States, 303; Clare Foran, “Donald Trump and the Triumph of Climate-
Change Denial,” The Atlantic, December 25, 2016, accessed December 29, 2016, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/donald-trump-climate-change-skeptic-
denial/510359/.; The Guardian, Climate Change scepticism, accessed December 29, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-change-scepticism. 
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moving forward with their policies and plans for the Arctic. The literature suggests this 
policy difference is due in part to geography and indigenous people.   
The impact of climate change on indigenous people is seen by the effects of rising 
sea levels on where they can live, their livelihood (hunting and fishing), and health 
concerns and from an increase in tourism and other human activities. By contrast, the 
strategies for Canada, Norway, and the Kingdom of Denmark incorporate the 
connectedness of the indigenous people to the land.68 
D. AIR AND MARITIME SAFETY
As in the previous section, the use of terms within the literature blurs the 
distinctions between air and maritime safety versus air and maritime security. The 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) established the Polar Code, which governs 
shipbuilding and operations in the polar region.69  From the IMO perspective, maritime 
safety means ships built to withstand the harsh arctic environment and warning systems 
to avoid hazards.   
The DOD and the USCG both agree that maritime awareness in the Arctic exists 
today, but the ability to conduct other missions such as search and rescue, disaster 
response, and maritime security are extremely limited due to long distances, harsh 
environment, limited infrastructure, and resources.70  A similar case exists for air safety–
an aircraft can safely traverse the Arctic, but there are limited search and rescue assets, 
68 Government of Canada, Global Affairs Canada, Canada and the Arctic, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/arctic-arctique/index.aspx?lang=eng.; Government of Canada. “Statement 
on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy 
Abroad.” 6.; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy 
(December 2006), https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/UD/Vedlegg/strategien.pdf, 7.; Daniel 
Buikema Fjaertoft, “Norwegian Grand Strategy and the Arctic,” Global Brief (June 27, 2011), 
http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2011/06/27/norwegian-grand-strategy-and-the-arctic/.; Kingdom of Denmark, 
“Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands: Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020,” 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, August 2011). 
http://www.uniset.ca/microstates/mss-denmark_en.pdf. 
69 International Maritime Organization, Shipping in Polar Waters, accessed December 15, 2016, 
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/default.aspx. 
70 United States Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest 
Passage, May 2011, 14-15. 
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communication systems, and infrastructure (e.g., hospitals) to rescue and/or recover 
personnel from an aircraft accident or incident.    
The consensus within the literature is that all nations want to enjoy freedom of 
navigation and overflight regardless of the where this takes place. Yet as more and more 
of the Arctic becomes navigable for shipping, there is a growing disparity between the 
Arctic and non-Arctic nations on shipping routes. China, Japan, and South Korea are the 
2nd, 5th, and 6th largest exporting nations in the world, respectively, yet they are only 
Observers to the Arctic Council, with no power or ability to change policy or direction of 
the Arctic Council.71  Norway is an active member of the Arctic Council and “views the 
Arctic as a top foreign and domestic policy priority.”  As such, it seeks to expand the 
influence of the Arctic Council, urging cooperation is better than conflict and as Espen 
Barth Eide, former Norwegian Minister of Defence said, “[w]e want people to join our 
club. That means they will not start another club.”72   
E. ENERGY SECURITY
Energy security within the Arctic occurs on a national level and involves more 
than just the Arctic Nations due in large part to opening of previously inaccessible areas 
for exploration of hydrocarbons. As in the previous sections, the United States has an 
Alaskan energy policy, drilling permitted in Prudhoe Bay, and another policy for the 
Arctic, as seen in former President Obama’s Executive Order banning drilling in the 
Arctic.73  President Trump overturned the Executive Order, which now awaits a decision 
from the District Court for the District of Alaska.74  While we are at odds with Russia 
71 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), CIA Factbook, Country Comparisons – Exports, accessed 
December 29, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2078rank.html.  
72 Arctic Council, Norway and the Arctic Region, accessed, November 12, 2016, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/member-states/Norway; Morten Brugård, “Norway says yes to China in 
Arctic Council’, Barents Observer. (January 22, 2013), 
http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2013/01/norway-says-yes-china-arctic-council-22–01. 
73 Exec. Order No. 13754, 3 C.F.R. 90669 (2016), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/12/14/2016-30277/northern-bering-sea-climate-resilience. 
74 Donald Trump, Executive Order 13795, “Implementing an American-First Offshore Energy 
Strategy,” Code of Federal Regulations, title 3 (2017 comp): 20815; EarthJustice, “LAWSUIT 
CHALLENGES TRUMP REVERSAL OF ARCTIC AND ATLANTIC DRILLING BAN,” May 3, 2107, 
accessed November 13, 2017, https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2017/lawsuit-challenges-trump-reversal-
of-arctic-and-atlantic-drilling-ban. 
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over the hacking of the Democratic National Committee email system, Syria and other 
events, Norway and others acknowledge Russia is not the same Russia as during the Cold 
War, but a neighbor they must engage for their own security and to ensure sustainability 
of the natural resources they both share.   
Within the literature is a three-way tension when it comes to energy security. On 
one side is the science, which claims the Arctic has the world’s largest untapped gas and 
oil reserves in the world. Environmental groups challenge the amount and value of gas 
and oil in the Arctic, especially in light of nations, companies and individuals moving 
away from gas and oil to renewable energy. The current administration wants to open up 
the Arctic for exploration; however, this back-and-forth on Arctic policy creates 
confusion with our allies and uncertainty for companies looking to invest in the Arctic. 
The third group comprises those in the gas and oil industry who predict that it will be 
years before wind and solar replace gas and oil, and in the meantime the indigenous 
people and their communities depend upon the gas and oil industry for jobs. There is 
significant unpredictability about how quickly the energy system will change from oil 
and gas to renewable energy. A specific issue is the expense of drilling for oil and gas in 
the Arctic given prevailing oil prices, i.e., cheaper reserves within the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and other competing sources of oil and gas. 
Finally, oil prices are sensitive to supply/demand balance as seen in 2014 when a 2 
million barrel oversupply caused oil prices to collapse from $100/barrel to $50.75  Other 
research suggests oil prices will never go above $50/barrel due to new techniques to 
extract oil from shale.76        
F. HOMELAND SECURITY
Finally, there are a variety of documents governing homeland security in the 
United States from the DOD, United States Navy, and USCG. Each highlights their 
75 Clifford Krauss, “Oil Prices: What to Make of the Volatility,” New York Times, June 14, 2017, 
accessed November 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/business/energy-environment/oil-
prices.html. 
76 Robert Looney, “Does OPEC have a Future?,” August 25, 2107, accessed November 13, 2017, 
http://web.nps.edu/Video/portal/Video.aspx?enc=yqTjB6mWdb9iHdUvQbdI%2fZrMnFNVdd5X. 
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specific role and mission in the Arctic but given the fiscal environment and other security 
issues, the Arctic remains a low priority. By contrast, the other Arctic Nations have a 
more comprehensive and cohesive strategy and plan. Here are samples from Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, and from the Observer Nations on the Arctic Council. 
Canada’s Arctic strategy is rooted in their Northern Strategy. This strategy 
recognizes their connectedness to the Arctic–geographically, its native peoples, and the 
need for leadership as the Arctic opens up to new opportunities. Its “first and most 
important pillar” is sovereignty and its first priority is to resolve boundary issues with 
Denmark and the United States.77  Canada’s unambiguously states their commitment to 
the Arctic in the closing of their Northern Strategy: 
Through our Arctic foreign policy, we are also sending a clear message: 
Canada is in control of its Arctic lands and waters and takes its 
stewardship role and responsibilities seriously. Canada continues to stand 
up for its interests in the Arctic. When positions or actions are taken by 
others that affect our national interests, undermine the cooperative 
relationships we have built, or demonstrate a lack of sensitivity to the 
interests or perspectives of Arctic peoples or states, we respond.78   
To date, Canada is the only ally of the United States moving ahead in the Arctic with 
respect to defense, law enforcement, and infrastructure development.79      
The Kingdom of Denmark includes Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands. 
Four pillars makeup Denmark’s Arctic strategy: security, self-sustaining growth and 
development, protecting the environment, and international cooperation. Building on the 
Danish Defence Agreement  2010–2014, the Danish Defence Agreement 2013–2017, 
recognized the strategic importance of the Arctic and need for an increase military 
presence in the Arctic to respond to spills and accidents from increased shipping in the 
77 Government of Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy, April 13, 2015, 9-10. 
78 Ibid., 27. 
79 Mate Wesley Aerandir, Breaking the Ice: Potential U.S.-Russian Maritime Conflict in the Arctic 
(Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 106. 
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Arctic.80  Like Canada, the Danish government’s policies and implementation plans are 
well ahead of the U.S. government. 
Norway’s Arctic strategy “considers the High North to be Norway’s most 
important strategic priority area in the years ahead,” a plan in one estimation “a step or 
two ahead”  of Russia, Canada, Denmark and the United States.81  
Finally, of the thirteen Observers countries on the Arctic Council, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Italy each have an Arctic Policy, with 
China, Japan, and South Korea nearing completion on their Arctic policy.82 
G. CONCLUSION
The Arctic by all indications is heating up–not only the weather but also the 
actions from numerous countries. Those nations not part of the Arctic Council see great 
potential in the Arctic–natural resources, decreased shipping times, etc. Except for 
Russia, the Arctic nations are democratic countries that seek peaceful relations with their 
neighbors, have reasonable laws and courts to settle disputes, and have stable economies 
which taken together should result in a peaceful Arctic for years to come.83  Despite 
historic low oil prices and a harsh environment, Russia is pressing ahead with its 
ambitious oil exploration program, improvements to infrastructure in the Arctic, and 
building numerous military bases and airfields. While Arctic and non-Arctic nations have 
strategies and policies in place, the United States is still a checkerboard of strategies, 
policies, and plans, with no single Department or Agency synchronizing the nation’s 
Arctic policy, activities, or infrastructure development.   
80 Danish Ministry of Defence, Danish Defence Agreement 2010–2014 (June 24, 2009); Danish 
Ministry of Defence, Danish Defence Agreement 2013-2017 (April 10, 2014).   
81 Daniel Buikema Fjaertoft, “Norwegian Grand Strategy and the Arctic,” Global Brief , June 27, 
2011, accessed November 21, 2016, http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2011/06/27/norwegian-grand-strategy-and-
the-arctic/.   
82 United States Department of State, Final Report of International Security Advisory Board on Arctic 
Policy, September 21, 2016.; Nengye Liu, The Diplomat, China’s Emerging Arctic Policy, December 14, 
2016, accessed January 1, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/tag/china-arctic-strategy/; Aki Tonami and Stewart 
Watters, Japan’s Arctic Policy: The Sum of Many Parts, Arctic Yearbook 2012, 93-103.; Martin Kossa, 
South Korea’s Positioning in the Arctic, September 30, 2015, accessed January 1, 2017, 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2015/09/30/south-korea%E2%80%99s-positioning-arctic. 
83 Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming,” 4. 
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III. METHOD
In this chapter, I begin by examining how decision makers fail to accept an 
alternate future and the limitations of models, simulations, and games to predict these. As 
an alternative to these three approaches, I introduce the concept of scenario planning and 
the process to develop scenarios as a framework to understand and incorporate 
uncertainty into one’s decision-making process. The thesis will use a modified “double 
uncertainty” matrix also known as the “2x2 matrix approach” utilizing scenarios 
representing four possible futures to evaluate the strategic patience and persistence 
strategy. These scenarios incorporate the most important factor, Russia, with the most 
uncertain factor, the rate of melting ice in the Arctic.84        
A. SCENARIO PLANNING 
1. Background
“All our knowledge is about the past, and all our decisions are about the future.”85  
Likewise, at the end of an investment commercial or in the fine print of a mutual fund 
perspective, we hear or read; past performance is no guarantee of future results. These 
two statements may seem self-evident but consider the following real world events: 
 Early last century, Brigadier General Billy Mitchell proposed using
airplanes to sink battleships by dropping bombs on them. The U.S.
Secretary of War Newton Baker remarked, “That idea is so damned
nonsensical and impossible that I’m willing to stand on the bridge of a
battleship while that nitwit tries to hit it from the air.”  Josephus Daniels,
Secretary of the Navy, was also incredulous: “Good God! This man should
be writing dime novels.”  Even the prestigious Scientific American
proclaimed in 1910 “to affirm that the aeroplane is going to
84 Muhammad Agar, Tugrul U. Daim and Anotnie Jetter, “A review of scenario planning,” Futures 
46(2013): 34, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2012.10.003. 
85 The quotation was taken from a presentation by Charles Yoe, “Scenario-Based Planning and 
Decision Making: Guidelines for Use in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Planning Studies and Literature 
Review,” slide 4 of 37, accessed July 16, 2017, https://www.slideshare.net/nrazn/scenario-based-planning-
and-decisionmaking.  
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‘revolutionize’ naval warfare of the future is to be guilty of the wildest 
exaggeration.”86 
 “During the war [World War II], the war with Japan had been re-enacted 
in the game rooms here by so many people and in so many different ways 
that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise—absolutely 
nothing except the kamikaze tactics towards the end of the war; we had 
not visualized those.”87 
 Writing with the “benefit and handicap of hindsight” the 9/11 Commission 
identified four kinds of failures: “imagination, policy, capabilities, and 
management.”  The report continues with three failures of imagination: 
Historical, Understanding the Danger, and Institutional.88  In April 2001, 
the North American Aerospace Defense Command along with other 
Defense agencies conducted exercise Positive Force 01. The exercise 
tested the Department of Defense’s ability to respond to multiple threats.89  
A proposed scenario of a terrorist group hijacking an airplane and flying it 
into the Pentagon was rejected as too unrealistic.90 
These events highlight how individuals and organizations remained focus on the 
here and now and assumed future events and outcomes would continue as they always 
had; no one envisioned a different future.91  After Action Reports, Lessons Learned, 
Congressional Hearings, Commission Reports (e.g. Warren, Tower, 9/11) and similar, 
chronicle what happened in order to prevent a repeat occurrence. Arie de Geus proposed 
five theories why managers and leaders fail to see what in hindsight was obvious.92  
                                                 
86 Paul J. H. Shoemaker, “Scenario Planning: A Tool for Strategic Thinking,” MIT Sloan Management 
Review, accessed September 13, 2017, http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/scenario-planning-a-tool-for-
strategic-thinking/. 
87 Admiral Chester Nimitz, United States Naval War College, “Gaming,” accessed July 16, 2017, 
https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/War-Gaming/Documents/RAGE/Gaming.aspx. 
88 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon 
the United States, official government edition, Washington, DC, National Commission on Terrorists 
Attacks on the United States, 2009, 339-360.   
89 “Positive Response,” GlobalSercurity.org, June 9, 2002, accessed July 29, 2017, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20030107033310/http:/www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/positive-force-
ex.htm. 
90  Julian Borger, "Hijackers Fly into Pentagon? No Chance, Said Top Brass," The Guardian, April 15, 
2004, accessed July 29, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/15/usa.september11. 
91 Sir James Cable, “Surprise and the single scenario,” The RUSI Journal, 128:1, 33-38, DOI: 
10.1080/03071848308522214 
92 Arie de Geus, The Living Company (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press: 1997), 28-37. 
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1. Managers/leaders are stupid.  de Geus suggests managers and leaders are 
not deaf, dumb, and stupid but rather, lack the skills “to cope with the 
changing nature of their environment.”93  
2. We can see only when a crisis opens our eyes. No one likes change for the 
sake of change, and at times, our nature is to resist change. While some 
might sum this up as no pain–no gain, de Geus contents a “company must 
act on the signals” not the pain.94 
3. We can see only what we have experienced.  de Geus tells the story of 
British explorers who in the early part of last century brought a tribal chief 
from the mountain regions of Malaysia to Singapore. The chief, whose 
tribe was still in the Stone Age, witnessed many things he had never seen 
before–ships, multi-story buildings, streets, diversity of people. When 
researchers asked him what the most important thing he saw was, he said 
he had never seen a man carry so many bananas. Buildings, ships, etc., 
were foreign to him, but a man pushing a cart loaded with bananas was 
something he could understand. This theory may explain why some are 
unable to react or be proactive. However, what accounts for the success 
and longevity of a dozen or so companies who are members of the 
Tercentenarian Club whose only membership requirement–be in existence 
for at least 300 years!95  Something else must be at work. 
4. We cannot see what is emotionally difficult to see. To illustrate this 
theory, de Geus uses the rise of the oil industry in the 1970s and its fall in 
the 1980s. When oil went from $2 a barrel to $30, those responsible for it, 
the Exploration and Production (E&P) sector of the company were 
rewarded and promoted to top management positions. Later when oil 
prices retreated to $10 per barrel, company executives, mostly with E&P 
backgrounds, rationalized if we give it time things will get better. Their 
emotions got the better of them. While you can never ignore emotions, we 
do need to factor them in one’s decision process in order to move 
forward.96 
5. We can see only what is relevant to our view of the future. This theory led 
de Geus to research conducted by David Ingvar, who concluded our brain 
is “constantly attempting to make sense of the future.”  As you read my 
thesis, your mind is wandering to other things: what will I have for lunch, 
                                                 
93 Ibid., 28. 
94 Ibid., 30. 
95 Ibid., 31-32 and Harry Wallop, “They’re 300 years old and still in business,” The Telegraph, 
January 1, 2013, accessed September 20, 2017, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/yourbusiness/9772950/Theyre-300-years-old-and-still-in-
business.html. 
96 Ibid., 32-34. 
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when will I return a colleague’s call, and so on. While these are not 
predictions of what we will or will not do, they are according to Ingvar an 
internal process within the brain to sort out the myriad of information our 
body receives (sees, hears, feels, tastes, and smells). Our perceptions are 
not just about collecting or rejecting bits and pieces of information, but 
rather an active process to develop and refine paths and courses of action. 
In other words, we need to take time to “visit our future.”97       
A wide variety of tools are available today to think about the future–BCG 
Growth-Share Matrix, SWOT Analysis, Porter’s Five Force Analysis, Value Chain 
Analysis, and Brainstorming. I will discuss what I believe is the most relevant strategic 
planning tool for thinking about the Arctic–scenario planning. Before that, I will discuss 
models, simulations, and games to provide context before moving to scenario planning.98 
2. Models – Simulations – Games 
Models, simulations, and games are tools used to forecast outcomes. Scenarios 
used for these three tools “do not have an intrinsic worth of their own,” they merely set 
the stage or parameters for the model, simulation, or game to run.99  What is the 
difference between models, simulations, and games?   
A model is a “physical, mathematical, or otherwise logical representation of a 
system, entity, phenomenon, or process.”100  Models cover multiple disciplines: 
economic–forecasting our Gross Domestic Product; aerodynamics–effects of icing on an 
airplane’s wing; meteorological–where the next hurricane might make landfall. 
Sometimes these forecasts are successful and at other times miss the mark or leave the 
observer wondering if the models are looking at the same data. Consider the various 
models and tracks from Hurricane Matthew, which struck the east coast of the U.S. in 
                                                 
97 Ibid., 34-37. 
98 Jay Ogilvy, “Scenario Planning and Strategic Forecasting,” Forbes, January 8, 2015, accessed 
September 13, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2015/01/08/scenario-planning-and-strategic-
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99 Ibid.,2. 
100 United States Army, Army Modeling and Simulation Office, Modeling and Simulation Glossary,” 
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2016, and its actual track depicted in the Figures 7 and 8. George Box characterized 
models as useful, even if they are wrong at times.101 
   
Figure 7. Models depicting path of Hurricane Matthew102 
                                                 
101 George E. P. Box, "Science and Statistics," Journal of the American Statistical Association, 71: 
791–799, doi:10.1080/01621459.1976.10480949 
102 David Caplan, “Matthew Weakens Slightly to a Category 4 Hurricane With Jamaica in Its Path,” 




Figure 8. Actual track of Hurricane Matthew103 
Simulations are “a method for implementing a model over time.”104  These 
include computer applications such as SimCity, Farming Simulator, ATC-Sim, to 
weather updates using Future Cast but also as a means to put learned concepts into 
practice. For example, in a classroom setting a firefighter trainee would learn how to fight 
a fire and what to do when things go wrong, but this classroom education becomes 
abundantly clear as the trainee enters a controlled fire in a burn house.  
Lastly, a game is “a physical or mental competition in which the participants, 
called players, seek to achieve some objective within a given set of rules.”105  Physical 
                                                 
103 National Weather Service, “Hurricane Matthew – October 8-9, 2016,” accessed August 13, 2017, 
http://www.weather.gov/mhx/MatthewSummary. 
104 United States Army Modeling and Simulation Office, Model and Simulation Glossary, accessed 
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105 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology, DoD Modeling and Simulation (M&S) 
Glossary, DOD Directive 5000.59-M, Washington, D.C.: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
Technology, 1998. 
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games include various sporting events (baseball, basketball, football, etc.) each with their 
own set of rules, fields of play to mental games using a deck of cards–Bridge, Pinochle; 
board games—Monopoly, Risk, Clue; or using one’s Smart Phone, tablet or other 
electronic device. Games could also entail a freewheeling environment where participants 
are given a problem or topic to discuss resulting in discovery learning.106  
B. SCENARIOS 
1. Background  
Broadly speaking, scenarios have been around for as long as man existed and 
pondered what the future might hold–consider Plato’s Republic or George Orwell’s 
1984.107  However, it was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s when Royal Dutch/
Shell developed a new method used today by many companies and governments– 
“scenario planning” or “decision scenarios” rather than using the typical forecast models 








                                                 
106 James John Tritten, Creative use of scenarios. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 
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Table 1.   Contrast between forecasts and reality–The oil supply109 
Date on Which 
Forecast Was 
Made 
The Forecast The Reality 
1885 Little or no chance of oil in 
California–USGS 
8 billion barrels produced there 
since then 
1891 Little or no chance of oil in 
Kansas or Texas–USGS 
14 billion barrels produced there 
since then 
1908 Maximum future supply: 22.5 
billion barrels–USGS Officials 
35 billion barrels produced since 
then 
1920 Peak domestic production 
(then 0.45 billion barrels per 
year) almost reached–Director, 
USGS  
1948 production was more than 
four times 1920 level 
1947 Sufficient oil cannot be in the 
United States to satisfy 
domestic demand–Chief 
Petroleum Division, State 
Department 
3 billion barrels found the next 
year, largest volume in history, 
and twice the annual 
consumption 
1949 End of U.S. oil supply almost 
in sight–Secretary of the 
Interior 





                                                 
109 Source: Brian Marsh, “Using Scenarios to Identify, Analyze, and Manage Uncertainty,” in 
Learning from the Future, ed. Liam Fahey and Robert M. Randall, (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc: 1998), 41. 
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Table 2.   Average weekly hours110 
Average Weekly Hours for the 
Manufacturing Sector 
1965 1975 1985 2000 
Predicted in 1965 41.1 41.5 38.9 32.0 
Actual 41.4 39.4 40.5 41.2 
 
Pierre Wack observed while forecasting tools were useful during stable times and 
conditions in the 1950s and 60s, during periods of uncertainty these missed the mark 
more often than not due in large part to too many moving parts and more importantly no 
“single projection” could predict the future anymore. He concluded it was better to accept 
ambiguity, try to make sense of it, and incorporate it into one’s reasoning and decision 
making process.111   
DOD defines scenarios as: 
a. Description of an exercise. It is part of the session database that 
configures the units and platforms and places them in specific locations 
with specific missions;  
b. An initial set of conditions and time line of significant events imposed 
on trainees or systems to achieve exercise objectives.112   
Herman Kahn, considered the father of scenario planning, defines a scenario as “a 
set of hypothetical events set in a future constructed to clarify a possible chain of casual 
events as well as their decision points.”113  In Table 3, Bill Ralston and Ian Wilson 
provide a list of what scenarios are and are not. 
                                                 
110 Predicted row adapted from: Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Weiner, The Year 2000: A Framework 
for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years (New York, NY: The Macmillan, 1967), 175 and Actual 
Row from: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Research, assessed September 17, 2017, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AWHMAN#0. 
111 Ibid. 
112 United States Army Modeling and Simulation Office, accessed August 28, 2017, 
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 36
Table 3.   Scenarios: What they are and are not114 
Scenarios are not… They are… 
Predictions Descriptions of alternate plausible futures 
Variations around a midpoint base case Significantly, often structurally, different 
views of the future 
“Snapshots” of endpoint (e.g., the market 
in 2010) 
“Movies” of the evolving dynamics of the 
future 
Generalized views of feared or desired 
futures 
Specific “decision-focused” views of the 
future 
Products of outside futurists Results of management insight and 
perceptions 
 
For this thesis, I will use the following definition for scenarios: “a tool for 
ordering one’s perception about alternative future environments, in which one’s decisions 
might be played out.”115 
2. Development of Scenarios  
Over the years, three schools of scenario planning developed: intuitive, 
probabilistic modified trends (PMT) and La prospective.116   
The intuitive method, proposed by Kahn and used by Wack at Royal Dutch/Shell 
is the dominant method used in the U.S. and abroad.117  This method relies on a skilled 
scenario team with knowledge of the problem and the ability to communicate the 
                                                 
114 Bill Ralston and Ian Wilson, The Scenario-Planning Handbook: A Practitioner’s Guide to 
Developing and Using Scenarios to Direct Strategy in Today’s Uncertain Times, (Crawsfordsville, IN: RR 
Donnelly, 2006), 16. 
115 Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View – Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World, (New 
York: Currency, 1996), 4. 
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interaction of several factors (political, social, environment, technology and others) to 
managers in a way for them to re-perceive “their decisions about the future.”118 
PMT combines Trend-Impact Analysis (TIA) and Cross-Impact Analysis (CIA) to 
produce a “range of alternative futures” instead of a single outcome. By combining TIA 
and CIA, PMT incorporates historical data and a list of unseen future events and then 
using expert judgment determines the probability of this event occurring over time.119 
Finally, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, France’s Office for Regional Planning 
and Development, developed the La prospective method. Used principally for public 
sector planning, this method sees the future not as a predetermined outcome but rather 
provides policy makers with future visions to serve as a guide for their future actions. 
Table 4 provides an overview of the three schools and their key features.
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Table 4.   Key features of the three scenario schools.131  
Characteristics Intuitive PMT La prospective 
Purpose Multiple, from a one-time activity 
to make sense of situations and 
developing strategy 
A one-time activity to make 
extrapolative prediction and 
policy evaluation 
Usually a one-time activity 
associated with developing more 
effective policy and strategic 
decisions 
Perspective “Descriptive or normative” “Descriptive” Generally descriptive 
Time frame “Varies: 3–20 years” “Varies: 3–20 years” “Varies: 3–20 years” 
Methodology Process oriented approach, 
essentially subjective and 
qualitative 
Outcome oriented approach, very 
directed, objective, quantitative 
and analytical using computer 
based extrapolative simulation 
models 
Outcome oriented approach, 
which is directed, objective, 
quantitative and analytical relying 
on complex computer based 
analysis and modeling 
Starting point “A particular management 
decision, issue or general 
concern” 
“Decisions/issues for which 
detailed and reliable time data 
exists” 
“A specific important 
phenomenon of concern” 
Identifying key 
driving forces 
Intuition, research, brainstorming 
techniques, and expert opinion 
Curve fitting to past time series 
data to identify trends and use 
expert judgment to create a 
database of unprecedented events 
Interviews with stakeholders and 
comprehensive structural analysis 




Qualitative set of equally 
plausible scenarios in narrative 
form with strategic options, 
implications, and early warning 
signals 
Quantitative baseline case plus 
upper and lower quartiles adjusted 
time series forecast  
Multiple quantitative and 
qualitative scenarios supported by 
comprehensive analysis, 
implications and possible actions 
Use of “No, all scenarios are equally “Yes, conditional probability of “Yes, probability of the evolution 
                                                 
131 Adapted from: Bradfield, et al, “The origins and evolution of scenario techniques in long range business planning, 807-808. 
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Characteristics Intuitive PMT La prospective 
probabilities probable” occurrence of unprecedented and 
disruptive future events” 
of variables under assumption set 
of actors’ behavior” 
Number of 
scenarios 
“Generally 2–4” “Usually 3–6 depends on the 





internal consistency, novelty, 
supported by rigorous structural 
analysis and logics” 
“Plausible and verifiable in 
retrospect” 
“Coherence, comprehensiveness, 
internal consistency tested by 
rigorous analysis; plausible and 
verifiable in retrospect” 
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3. Steps to Develop a Scenario 
Business models, strategic plans, long range planning and the like consider a 
variety of goals: where do we want to be in 3, 5, 10 or more years from now, how do I 
maintain my current rate of growth, how do we expand our business in to new markets 
and so forth. These use a variety of models–Value Networks, Strategy Diamond, 
Staehler’s model in the Digital Economy, Business Model Canvas, four-box and 
others.132  Scenario planning takes a different approach and “shifts the question from 
whether something will happen to what we would do if it did happen?”  The planning 
cycle using scenarios requires a different approach.133 
A variety of scenario development models is available. Figure 9 depicts SRI 
International’s scenario development model and forms the basis for subsequent scenario 
development models.134  
  
Figure 9. SRI scenario development model135 
                                                 
132 Tim Kastelle, “Eight Models of Business Models, & Why They’re Important,” accessed September 
14, 2017, http://timkastelle.org/blog/2012/01/eight-models-of-business-models-why-theyre-important/. 
133 Quote attributed to Aries de Geus, Shell Planning Group, from presentation by Harbottle 
Consulting, accessed September 14, 2017, http://www.slideserve.com/leal/effective-planning-risk-
management-in-an-uncertain-business-environment. 
134 Peter Schwartz and James A. Ogilivy, “Plotting Your Scenarios,” in Learning from the Future, ed. 
Liam Fahey and Robert M. Randall, (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc: 1998), 60. 
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Drawing on two decades of work in scenario planning, shown in Figure 10 is the 
eight-step process developed by Peter Schwartz.136  I used this process to develop the key 
factors, scenarios, and early indicators for the four scenarios used in Chapter V. 
   
Figure 10. Eight-step scenario planning process137 
1. Identify focal issue. This is done by building “from the outside in” versus 
the “inside out.”  For example, what cars or products should we have if the 
price of gas doubles in ten years, making our 10 mpg line of cars 
unaffordable? 
2. Key factors in local the environment. Identify the stable or unchanged 
forces in any of the scenarios over time.138 
3. External forces. This step tries to answer two important questions. What 
forces will drive those factors listed in step two and secondly, if only I had 
known then what happened today, e.g., knowing today when a 
breakthrough in affordable battery technology might happen, which could 
result in millions of people getting off the grid?  An influence or driving 
                                                                                                                                                 
135 Ralston and Wilson, The Scenario-Planning Handbook, 23. 
136 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 241-247. 
137 Ogilvy, “Scenario Planning and Strategic Forecasting.” 
138 Peter Schwartz et al, “Basic Approaches to Constructing Scenario,” in Learning from the Future, 
ed. Liam Fahey and Robert M. Randall, (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc: 1998), 55-186; Ralston 
and Wilson, The Scenario-Planning Handbook, 25, 39-177; and Kees Van Der Heijden, Scenarios – The 
Art of Strategic Conversation, (Chichester, West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd: 2005), 219-272. 
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force analysis diagram can visually depict trends over time and depict 
what is driving what. Figure 11 depicts an influence diagram. 
    
Figure 11. National security strategy influence diagram139 
4. Critical uncertainties. The goal of this step is to identify two or three key 
factors or trends that are both important and uncertain. 
5. Scenario logics. While the previous step may produce several factors or 
trends of importance and uncertainty, the goal of this step is to reduce this 
number to as few as possible, “whose differences make a difference to the 
decision maker” and then construct a scenario.140  Construction of 
scenarios typically follows one of three methods: inductive, deductive and 
incremental.141  I will discuss each method later.          
6. Scenarios. This step ensures factors and trends identified in steps two and 
three are contained in each scenario.   
7. Implications and options. By this point, you should have well defined 
scenario(s). Each scenario is rehearsed with individuals role-playing, 
looking for the scenario’s strengthen and weakness. Ultimately, does the 
scenario get to the focal issue identified in step one?   
                                                 
139 Dan McCauley, “U.S.-Iran Rapprochment,” Small Wars Journal, January 19, 2014, accessed 
November 13, 2017, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/us-iran-rapprochement. 
140 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 243. 
141 Van Der Heijden, Scenarios – The Art of Strategic Conversation, 236-254. 
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8. Early Indicators. Scenarios allow decision makers to consider an 
“alternative future environment.”142  Establishing indicators or signposts 
provides an early warning that what might happen is about to happen. In 
the business world, these indicators or signposts would give a company a 
competitive advantage over their competition. For homeland security, this 
may result in gaining a strategic advantage over an adversary or 
preventing an adversary from gaining a strategic advantage over you. 
As mentioned above in step five, three methods are used to structure scenarios: 
inductive, deductive and incremental.143  In the inductive method, the scenario begins 
from the specific to the general and can involve two approaches.144  In the first approach, 
a series of storylines are built around a significant future event that may occur–if x 
happens how does that affect our bottom line?  This approach is similar to putting 
together a jigsaw puzzle. The puzzle pieces represent the various events and decisions 
needed to achieve the future event. One way is to link a series of events or decisions into 
a logical order, not unlike putting together the frame or edge of the jigsaw puzzle. The 
second is to build natural grouping of events or decisions that at first do not appear 
connected to others, but with one key piece, these disparate groups come together. The 
second approach, which differs slightly from the first, begins with a decision most likely 
to occur and then maps the factors or drivers leading to this decision/outcome. Typically, 
this is done through a series of cause-and-effect snippets or vignettes. While this method 
has great potential, it comes with several cautions. It can cause planners to create good 
scenarios–answers what the boss wants to hear and bad scenarios–challenges an 
organization’s mission resulting in managers digging in their heels. The root cause of the 
good versus bad approach is seeing the world as black-and-white, good or bad, more of 
the same and views change as something negative rather than a challenge and 
opportunity.145 
                                                 
142 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 4. 
143 Van Der Heijden, Scenarios – The Art of Strategic Conversation, 236. 
144 Ibid., 236-237 and Schwartz and Ogilivy, “Plotting Your Scenarios,” 62-64. 
145 Van Der Heijden, Scenarios – The Art of Strategic Conversation, 128-130. 
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The deductive method is better suited for organizations where open and honest 
discussions are more difficult.146  This method begins from the general to the specific or 
particular and achieves this by grouping the data into a few outcomes or end states. This 
process is akin to grouping/organizing a white-board with trends, key-words, or notes 
written on Post-its. From here, a scenario is constructed based on events, trends, or 
structure.147  Figure 12 shows a typical event tree based on a logical flow of events and 
decisions. 
 
Figure 12. Simple event tree148 
The second approach uses key trends when identifying key events is difficult. A 
current trend today is reducing one’s carbon footprint–a practice a business should adopt 
because it is trending, the right thing to do, good for business or a combination of these.   
Finally, the third and approach I will use in my thesis, identifies two or three key 
forces, and creates unique scenarios based on the outcomes of the key forces; typically 
depicted as a 2x2 matrix, where one axis represents the highest uncertain factor and the 
other axis, the factor with the greatest potential impact.149  This method affords several 
advantages. It provides an academic approach to problems, avoids reducing the problem 
                                                 
146 Schwartz and Ogilivy, “Plotting Your Scenarios,” 64. 
147 Van Der Heijden, Scenarios – The Art of Strategic Conversation, 243. 
148 Alma Maria Jennifer Gutierrez, “Fault Tree and Event Tree in Risk Analysis,” accessed September 
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149 Rafael Ramirez and Angela Wilkinson, “Rethinking the 2x2 scenario method: Grid or frames?,” 
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 86 (2014): 254-255, doi: 10.1016/j.techfore.2013.10.020. 
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to a single choice, provides a list of best-case/worst-case options, explains an otherwise 
complicated problem with easy-to-understand  outlooks and alternatives not previously 
considered, is easy to communicate to decision makers, and generates extreme solutions 
to opposing forces.150  Downsides to the 2x2 matrix include: the four corners/scenarios 
may not contain all the possible outcomes, and planners may settle on easy forces to ease 
anxiety or avoid studying the factors at length.151  The reader needs only to reread the 
examples at the beginning of this chapter as a reminder how an unrealistic future or lack 
of imagination became a reality.   
Until recently, 2x2 matrices fell into four categories: backbone, foundation, 
scaffold and showcase. As a physical backbone support a body, the axes in a scenario 
matrix are the backbone supporting the four scenarios. Foundation scenarios use a 
common framework or foundation to develop scenarios. A scaffold is useful when 
erecting a building, but eventually it gets in the way and is taken down, similarly, the 
scaffold scenario gets the ball rolling, then is abandoned to develop an array of scenarios. 
Finally, the showcase is analogous to putting Post-Its on a board organized around 
different themes, as opposed to driving forces used for backbones.152  In their research, 
Ramirez and Wilkinson, found a fifth category based on a methodological choice; do the 
axes represent a continuum (more or less grid) or a set of incommensurate possibilities 
(either/or frames)?153  Table 5 provides an overview of these two methodologies.
                                                 
150 Ramirez and Wilkinson, “Rethinking the 2x2 scenario method: Grid or frames?,” 258. 
151 Van Der Heijden, Scenarios – The Art of Strategic Conversation, 250-251. 
152 Marjolein B.A. van Asselt, et al, Foresight in Action – Developing Policy-Oriented Scenarios 
(New York: Earthscan, 2010), 61-75.  
153 Ramirez and Wilkinson, “Rethinking the 2x2 scenario method: Grid or frames?,” 258-259. 
 46











present or past 
Communicating the 
scenarios to those 
not producing them 









at the center of 
matrix, not in 
any of the 
scenario 
quadrants 
Clear and memorable 
framework that 
provides a structure 
for rich storytelling 
about the interplay of 










From now to one of 










Present and past 
in any location 




attention and effort 









present and future 
situations 
From past to present 




                                                 
154 Ibid., 262. 
 47
In situations where scenario planning is new, or an organization is resistant to 
change, the incremental method offers a way to introduce scenario planning.155  The 
incremental method begins with an organization’s official future, where they see 
themselves in whatever timeline they created. Then it looks for obstacles that will either 
prevent the organization from ever achieving their future or not in their estimated 
timeline. Two methods are used to create these scenario–trend analysis and actor logic.156  
In the former, planners analyze where the official future is achievable based on current 
trends, forecasts, and conditions. While the latter examines the key actors needed to 
achieve the official future and is the logic used to develop the official future consistent 
with their thinking. In most cases, the planners will identify hurdles the official future 
will need to overcome in order to be successful. The objective of this method is to change 
the organization’s thought from thinking inside the box to the outside-in approaches of 
the either the inductive or deductive methods. 
C. CONCLUSION 
One can think about the future in a variety of ways. Daydreaming is a fanciful 
approach, while models, simulations, and games provide a systematic and scientific 
method for looking at the future. One could even approach the future through a problem-
solving approach: define the problem, gather evidence, propose alternatives, select 
criteria, project outcomes, weigh pros/cons, decide, and implement. All of these methods 
approach the future from the inside out. Scenarios on the other hand take an outside-in 
look at the future by exploring the problem space versus trying to predict it and 
embracing the uncertainty of the future rather than dismissing it. While many predictions 
and forecasts abound for the Arctic, there are still many unknowns.   
Before presenting the four scenarios, I will examine the strategic patience and 
persistence strategy, and more broadly the absence of a strategy–is it a real strategy or an 
oversight by policy makers not ready to tackle a wicked problem. 
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IV. STRATEGIC PATIENCE AND PERSISTENCE STRATEGY 
Strategies come in all shapes and sizes and across many disciplines. Military 
strategies include air superiority, blitzkrieg, flanking maneuvers, and others. In business, 
typical strategies involve firms dominating their industry, monopolizing critical 
resources, or out-innovating their competitors. A good strategy recognizes the challenges, 
provides a way ahead, and typically has three elements or “kernel”: a diagnosis, guiding 
policy, and coherent action.157  In this chapter, I will examine a couple avoidance 
strategies before turning to the strategic patience and persistence strategy introduced by 
then President Obama in 2015.    
A. KEEPING YOUR POWDER DRY 
In 1642 at the Battle of Edgehill, Oliver Cromwell reportedly told his troops, “Put 
your trust in God, my boys, but mind to keep your powder dry.”158  In 2002, then 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld during a news conference said “As we know, 
there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are 
known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But 
there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.”159  Lastly, 
Carl von Clausewitz in his work On War said, “War is the realm of uncertainty; three 
quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or 
lesser uncertainty,” from which comes the saying–the fog of war.160  These highlight the 
impossibility of knowing everything before making a decision, whereby one strategy is to 
preserve one’s options, by waiting and seeing. Is the strategic patience and persistence 
strategy keeping one’s powder dry, to come out guns blazing, when, and if needed?   
                                                 
157 Richard P. Rumelt,  Good Strategy Bad Strategy: the Difference and Why It Matters (Crown 
Business, 2011), loc 188 and 241 of 5141, Kindle. 
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Ali, August 7, 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GiPe1OiKQuk.  
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When analyzing strategies, researchers and strategists may try to fit the strategy 
into a known typology or create a new one when an outlier does not fit the pattern of 
known strategies. However, the outlier may represent absence as a strategy.161  I will 
look at several theories on strategy absence and decision avoidance and apply these to the 
strategic patience and persistence strategy.   
1. Theory of Strategy Absence 
The theory of Strategy Absence begins by rejecting the assumption all 
organizations have a strategy, whether explicit or implicit, to include models and theories 
such as the garbage can model, inertia theory, and others.162  What follows are three 
approaches to understand strategy absence.  
a. Absence as failure 
On the surface, the absence of a strategy may indicate leadership failure to 
develop a strategy and erroneously cause one to look for a reason for this failure.163  
Research conducted by Miles and Snow identified four organizational types each with 
their own unique strategy: Defender, Reactor, Analyzer, and Prospector.164  Reactors, 
despite perceiving change, are unable to respond to it and lack a dependable strategy, 
eventually these organizations move to one of other three typologies.165  This suggests 
the absence of a strategy. However, the presence or absence of a strategy does not imply 
a successful or failed strategy, rather only that one exists or does not. An established 
strategy executed poorly and focused on the wrong goals in some cases is worse than no 
strategy at all. 
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b. Absence as transition 
A failing strategy may cause an organization to reevaluate its strategy and for a 
time abandon its failed strategy in search of a new one. This was the case for American 
auto manufactures during the automakers turbulent years in the late 1980s and early 
1990s and most recently when GM announced it would build 20 new electric car models 
by 2023.166  One might argue transitions only happen for well-established organizations. 
Others see the tech boom of early 1980s when personal computers began to enter the 
market place as a time of rapid transition for developers, manufactures, programmers and 
others trying to gauge and respond to consumer demand for this budding technology.167 
c. Absence as virtue 
In this approach, management makes a deliberate decision not to have a strategy 
either for constructive ambiguity or symbolic reasons. In the first case, ambiguity allows 
an organization to remain flexible rather than held hostage by its own strategy. In the 
Miles and Snow typology, this is the Prospector strategy. The Prospector’s product or 
innovation allows them to trade efficiency in order to respond to unforeseen changes. Not 
tied to a strategy allows an organization to experiment and in the process the organization 
undergoes discovery learning. This was the case for Honda in the early 1960s when they 
entered the motorcycle market, which Harley-Davidson dominated at the time. Honda 
had no strategy other than to sell motorcycles; they were free to innovate, and only 
afterwards did they develop a strategy.168  This model is common in tech start-up 
companies today. Others describe the typology as tents versus palaces–responsive/
flexible versus unresponsive/entrenched.   
Strategy fulfills a symbolic and material role. Leaders see it as providing direction 
to the organization; subordinates as an ideal to rally around. Consider the Military 
Service academies’ mottos: Duty, Honor, Country; From Knowledge, Seapower; and 
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Integrity First–Service Before Self–Excellence in All We Do. From a materialistic 
viewpoint, leaders may view strategies as not a good use of their company’s resources 
and “unnecessary as a competitive weapon.”169 
2. Decision Avoidance  
Simply put decision avoidance is the “tendency to avoid making a choice by 
postponing it or by seeking an easy way out that involves no action or no change.”170  
Researchers identified four phenomena for this: status quo bias, omission bias, choice 
deferral, and inaction inertia.171 
Status quo bias or cognitive myopia is the concept whereby an individual chooses 
an immediate smaller gain or benefit over a larger gain/benefit happening in the future.172  
Said differently, the individual or decision maker has an inflated view of the current 
situation and sees no need to change. Similar to status quo bias is omission bias, whereby 
the preference is for “options that do not require action.”173   
Three theories exist why individuals would prefer the status quo or avoid action 
when doing so would be beneficial to them. First is regret–they changed before, only to 
discover that the grass wasn’t greener on the other side. Loss or risk aversion–the 
potential loss is greater than the potential gain. Lastly, a lack of imagination– incremental 
change is preferred to what appears to them as a revolutionary or disruptive change. 
Choice deferral is when “an individual chooses not to choose for the time being” 
in order to research options, conduct course of action analysis, and then either decides not 
to pursue any course of action or defers the decision to someone else.174  There are three 
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reasons for choice deferral. Conflict–resulting in longer searches and more options. 
Additionally, when given too many options, justifications tend to get limited making the 
choice more difficult. Value maximization–how does one value or rate the options given 
their differences. Finally, preference uncertainty–not knowing what your future self or 
organization will like or benefit from because your future self or organization has yet to 
make up its mind.175 
Lastly, inaction inertia is the “tendency of a person to omit action when he or she 
already passed up a similar, more attractive opportunity to act.”176  Root cause of this is 
counterfactual thinking–if only I had bought Apple stock, I could have retired by now, 
along with regret and an over or under perception of costs. 
3. Real Options 
Real Options enable decision makers to manage risks, rather than reacting to 
them, by either delaying a decision to invest/divest until conditions are more 
favorable.177  Drawing from Richard Danzig’s Driving in the Dark, here are a couple real 
options the DOD could undertake. Given the unpredictability of the future in general and 
the Arctic specifically, the DOD should “prioritize equipment that is most adaptable” and 
“accelerate decision tempo and delay some decisions.”178  The first axiom is seen in 
planes like the B-52H and RC-135 which entered the U.S. Air Force inventory in the 
1960s and continue to fly today, while specialized aircraft like the A-6 (1971-1991), F-
111 (1967-1998), C-141 (1965-2006) and MH-53 (1981-2008) have come and gone.179  
The latter pushes critical decisions to the last possible moment in the decision cycle 
rather than trying to solve them in earlier phases, which demands a new decision 
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framework for the DOD, one following the private sector model of days/weeks/months 
versus months and years currently done within the DOD. 
4. Conclusion  
Non-events, by definition, go unnoticed and attempting to make connections or 
measurements between a non-event and a particular outcome are difficult. Was the 
success of the organization due in some part or all because they had no strategy, or the 
product was so good, it sold itself, or because of strong leadership?  Strategy absence 
does not equate to a rudderless ship or imply a lack of focus or capabilities but rather 
allows an organization to consider all factors and not just those that meet their immediate 
strategic plans or objectives. While there are several reasons why decision makers may 
avoid making a decision, none of these is insurmountable. Indeed, delay may be a better 
option or the least–worst option. Lastly, real options provide decision makers a means to 
exploit uncertainty to their advantage. The next section looks at the strategic patience and 
persistence strategy applying the theories from this section to understand this strategy.         
B. A STRATEGY IN SEARCH OF MEANING? 
In the forward to the 2015 National Security Strategy, then President Obama 
wrote: 
As powerful as we are and will remain, our resources and influence are not 
infinite. And in a complex world, many of the security problems we face 
do not lend themselves to quick and easy fixes. The United States will 
always defend our interests and uphold our commitments to allies and 
partners. But, we have to make hard choices among many competing 
priorities, and we must always resist the over-reach that comes when we 
make decisions based upon fear. Moreover, we must recognize that a 
smart national security strategy does not rely solely on military power.  … 
The challenges we face require strategic patience and persistence. They 
require us to take our responsibilities seriously and make the smart 
investments in the foundations of our national power. [emphasis added]180 
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In the charge political environment of the day, pundits and critics simultaneously 
praised and vilified the 2015 National Security Strategy especially the phrase ”strategic 
patience and persistence.”181 
Patience does suggest waiting, and while this seems demoralizing, I 
defend it, because more active approaches have huge downsides.182  
… too often, what’s missing here in Washington is a sense of perspective 
… While the dangers we face may be more numerous and varied, they are 
not of the existential nature we confronted during World War II or during 
the Cold War. We cannot afford to be buffeted by alarmism in a nearly 
instantaneous news cycle183 
I doubt ISIL, the Iranian mullahs, or Vladimir Putin will be intimidated by 
President Obama’s strategy of “Strategic Patience.”184  
The strategy offered by the White House is mostly Pablum.185 
It’s not a strategy in any normal sense of the word. There’s no vision, no 
short- or long-term objectives, no priorities, no sense of acceptable 
means186 
The strategy appears to lack clear guidance and described by some as a strategy of 
leading from behind–doing little to nothing until something happens, someone crosses a 
red line and only then, the U.S. reacts. One could argue this has been the U.S. approach 
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with respect to North Korea, and raises questions about this strategy.187  Is this a failed 
strategy not worth continuing?  Is there ever value in doing nothing and how does one 
determine the tipping point when action is needed?  How does one measure success?   
In a broader context, does the strategic patience and persistence strategy contain a 
kernel: a diagnosis that clearly recognizes the challenges of the situation, a guiding policy 
that points to a general way ahead and a set of coherent actions that back-up the guiding 
policy?  I believe so even if short on specifics:   
Diagnosis: Our resources and influence are not infinite and in an uncertain 
world, it may be better to wait until the path is clearer, as we see in three 
scenarios before making any large commitments. 
Guiding policy: We will keep our powder dry and wait until the path 
forward becomes clear. Because, we have diverse resources to protect our 
security–military, diplomatic, partnerships–we can afford to carry a little 
risk in some area without sweating it too much. 
Set of coherent actions:  We have a sufficient set of indirect actions that 
will us to react/respond to three of the four scenarios  While the fourth 
scenario comes with a certain amount of risk, as the lone super power, we 
are able to shoulder this risk and respond when and if needed, in order to 
achieve our national goals for the Arctic.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Depending on whom you are the strategic patience and persistence strategy may 
convey the following: a failure by leadership to define a hard and fast strategy; a 
willingness for flexibility and efficiency; acknowledgment of the unknown unknowns; or 
making a small investment now in hope of a greater return later. All of these have an eye 
toward keeping the Nation’s powder dry until needed. In the next chapter, I will present 
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/north-koreas-rocket-launch-shows-that-mr-obamas-strategic-
patience-has-failed/2016/02/08/dd4a6d4e-ce8e-11e5-88cd-
753e80cd29ad_story.html?utm_term=.26aec084d540; and Nicolas K. Gvosdev, “The Flaws of Obama’s 
‘Strategic Patience’,” The National Interest, January 21, 2016, accessed October 8, 2017, 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-flaws-obamas-strategic-patience-14973?page=2.; Charles 
Krauthammer, “The Obama doctrine: Leading from behind,” Washington Post, April 28, 2011, accessed 
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four potential future scenarios for the Arctic with the U.S. employing the strategic 
patience and persistence strategy.     
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V. SCENARIOS AND RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Scenario development is a systematic process. From our national goals for the 
Arctic, Chapter I, along with the literature review, Chapter II, and analysis of strategic 
patience and persistence strategy, Chapter IV, I identified the key issues, critical forces, 
and drivers in the Arctic.188  Table 6 presents these in an Impact–Uncertainty Matrix. 
Impact reflects the influence this driver has on future outcomes while uncertainty is the 
degree to which the future outcomes are ambiguous.189   
Table 6.   Impact-uncertainty matrix 










 Low Medium High 
High 
-New territorial claims 
in the Arctic 
- Increase in maritime 
traffic through the Arctic 
 
- U.S. Energy Security 
- Shipping Routes 





- Uncertainty of U.S. 
environmental policies 
- OPEC’s long-term 
strategy 
- Militarization of the 
Arctic 
Medium 
- Privatization efforts in 
the Arctic: tourism, 
renewable energy. 
- Worldwide movement 
to alternative energy 
 
- Search & Rescue 
capabilities 
- U.S. fracking impacts 
on world oil markets 
- Weak governance by 
Arctic Council  
-Impact of non-Arctic 
nations on trade 
- Improve infrastructure 
in the Arctic 
- U.S. ratifies UNCLOS 
- World demand for oil, 
gas, minerals, etc. 
Low 
  - Research and 
development in the 
Arctic 
- U.S. National will 
- Increase U.S. deficit 
with Arctic expansion 
 
                                                 
188 Raslton and Wilson, The Scenario-Planning Handbook, 73-103. 
189 Ibid., 103-109. 
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From this matrix, the next step is to identify the key axes of uncertainty. What are 
the key variables that may independently influence policy in the Arctic?  What 
independent variables drive uncertainties in the Arctic?  Of greatest concern are those 
outlined with the bold border, darkest gray area, in Table 6. I believe Russia’s actions and 
motives in the Arctic constitute the greatest impact and forecasting the sea ice levels the 
force most difficult to predict. Figure 13 depicts the set of four possible scenarios derived 





























































Slow Arctic Ice Melting 
Greatest impact – Russia 
Most uncertainty – Melting Arctic Sea Ice 
New Spice Route 
 Trade epicenter 
 Shared capabilities 
 Energy break through 
Arctic Russian Bear 
 Limited diplomacy 
 World at risk 
 Energy crisis 
Arctic Renaissance  
 Shared resources 
 Joint ventures 
 Economic uncertain frontier 
 
Sochi Pact 
 New coalitions 
 Exploitation of resources 
 Territorial claims 
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In the next sections, I will examine how each scenario might evolve given the 
forces, trends, and uncertainties. These four scenarios and their narratives provide 
decision makers a means to “think about future threats and opportunities,” especially 
when viewed through the lens of the strategic patience and persistence strategy.190             
B. SCENARIO 1: NEW SPICE ROUTE 
Trade between the Far East and Europe first took place via the Silk Road, an 
overland route from China, through modern day Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, ending 
eventually in Rome. The rise of the Ottoman Empire in 1453 made this route 
economically unfeasible due to high taxes levied by the Ottoman Empire on those bound 
for Rome. Merchants turned from an overland route to a sea route, known as the Spice 
Route.191  Six hundred years later, a new Spice Route opens because of the rapid ice 
melting in the Arctic.192  Manufactures in the Far East now transport their goods to 
Europe and North America via the Arctic, nearly year round, saving time, fuel, and 
money over previous routes around the Cape of Good Hope or through the Suez and 
Panama Canals. While this was possible as early as 2010, the Arctic Ocean is now open 
to shipping 7 months of the year, with no assistance needed by icebreakers. The other 5 
months, icebreakers are needed less than 50% of the time to ensure safe passage through 
the three arctic shipping routes (NWP, NSR and TSR). Russia’s fleet of icebreakers made 
this shift possible along with their cooperation with the world’s shipping and 
manufacturing industries. While other Arctic nations have icebreakers, most 
commissioned between 1990 and 2010, many are now reaching the end of their service 
life. The United States retired their last icebreaker in 2021 and other countries stopped 
construction and further development on icebreakers due to the Arctic’s rapid ice 
melting. Two shifts by Russia and industry made using the Arctic seaways nearly year 
round possible. As Russia seized the initiative in supplying rockets to service the 
                                                 
190 Ibid., 125-133. 
191 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, “About the Silk Road,” accessed 
November 17, 2017, https://en.unesco.org/silkroad/about-silk-road. 
192 Jugal K. Patel and  Henry Fountain, “As Arctic Ice Vanishes, New Shipping Routes Open,” New 
York Times, May 3, 2017, accessed November 17, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/03/science/earth/arctic-shipping.html. 
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International Space Station when NASA retired the Shuttle program, so now Russia is 
taking the lead to ensure safe navigation through the Arctic.193  This shift by Russia 
started elsewhere in the 1990s with the shared economy or peer-to-peer businesses. 
Airbnb, Uber, eBay, and others transformed and disrupted their perspective business 
sector.194  The Arctic shared economy includes Russia’s willingness to allow its 
icebreakers to keep commerce and good moving through the Arctic and for shippers and 
manufactures to collaborate with them, thereby keeping their costs down and getting 
goods to market faster. 
Russia and China enter into an agreement allowing China’s State Construction & 
Engineering Corporation to construct five floating island cities: three in Russia’s 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), one north of Greenland and the other north of Canada; 
the latter two via an agreement with Denmark and Canada. Once completed, scientists 
and tourists, and the multinational Arctic law enforcement organization will use these; 
additionally they will provide a safe harbor and a communication platform for those 
transiting the Arctic Ocean.195  These floating island cities close two current gaps in the 
Arctic: more responsive search-and-rescue capability reducing response time from days 
or weeks to hours or less, and reliable and redundant communications.196 
Energy security is the third transformation taking place in the Arctic. This 
transformation is not from additional oil or gas platforms or dredging for minerals as 
more of the Arctic Ocean becomes ice-free but rather utilizing the methane gas released 
as the permafrost thaws. After the Paris Agreement, Russian energy companies partnered 
                                                 
193 Loren Thompson, “Ripples From Crimea In Space: U.S. Seeks To End Reliance On Russian 
Engines For Satellite Launches,” Forbes, April 7, 2014, accessed November 17, 2017, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/07/new-rocket-engine-needed-to-rescue-americas-
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194 “The rise of the sharing economy: Peer-to-peer rental,” The Economist, May 9, 2013, accessed 
November 17, 2017, https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-
sharing-economy. 
195 Carl T.F. Ross and Ricardo Rodriguez McCullough, “Conceptual Design of a Floating Island 
City,” The Journal of Ocean Technology 5, No. 1, 2010, accessed November 17, 2017, 
http://www.thejot.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/V5N1-Homeward-Bound-FINAL2.pdf. 
196 A.K. Sydnes et al, “International Cooperation on Search and Rescue in the Arctic,” Arctic Review 
on Law and Politics, Vol. 8, 2017.  Accessed November 19, 2017, 110, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v8.705. 
 63
with several European companies who embarked upon a biogas revolution in order to 
achieve the Agreement’s goals.197  Over the years, this partnership refined the recovery 
process, improved biogas engines, and developed other uses for biogas all in anticipation 
to capture the methane gas released due to the Arctic thaw. 
Through these changes, the United States remained on the sidelines viewing the 
Arctic as a distant region with little or no connection to the lower 48 states and 
concentrated on issues closer to home–repairing crumbling infrastructure, improving 
cyber security, fixing a slowing economy and other issues. 
C. SCENARIO 2: ARCTIC RENAISSANCE  
Russia continues to spend billions in the Arctic improving infrastructure, building 
new military installations, repurposing others, training and stationing soldiers in the 
region and building a fleet of 62 icebreakers, despite years of accelerated melting of the 
sea in the Arctic. Russia defends the build-up citing long overdue modernization of its 
arctic forces and achieving four national goals: enhance internal security, study 
environmental changes taking place in the Arctic due to the accelerated melting of the 
Arctic ice, support its drilling and mining efforts, and provide Search and Rescue 
capability due to increase Arctic maritime traffic. Others speculate the build-up is to 
counter Finland and Sweden joining the NATO Alliance and an attempt by the Russians 
to control the Arctic and win a second Cold War.198  Finland and Sweden view their 
NATO membership not as a challenge Russia but as support to their neighbor, Norway, 
and as providing a united Nordic front for cooperation with Russia.199  Most other Arctic 
                                                 
197 John Abraham, “Methane release from melting permafrost could trigger dangerous global 
warming,” The Guardian, October 13, 2016, accessed November 17, 2017, 
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Nations, including the U.S., curtailed development in the Arctic due to costs, lessening of 
sea ice, and low risks to national security.  
The United Nations continues to reject Russia’s territorial claims beyond the 200-
mile EEZ. Not fazed by these setbacks, Russia continues to drill for oil and mine for 
minerals in their EEZ. Technical and equipment failures combined with low pay, harsh 
drilling/mining conditions, and a lack of a qualified work-force have failed to achieve the 
Russian government forecasts for oil and mineral production in the Arctic. To overcome 
these setbacks, Russia partners with four multinational mining and drilling companies 
from Australia, United Kingdom, Brazil, and South Africa and begins to make marginal 
progress. Despite ongoing unrest and uncertainty in the Middle East and between OPEC 
members, industrial experts continue to question Russia’s exploration in the Arctic. The 
oil industry has seen stable prices for 20 plus years ($25/barrel compared to $51/barrel in 
2017), and a global reduction for oil demand due in large part to a breakthrough in 
autonomous electric vehicles, which created an on demand transport service and 
electrical generation almost exclusively from wind and solar.200  Adding to the low but 
stable oil prices was a decision made in mid-2010s by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
when they enacted their Vision 2030, which sold off a large portion of the state owned oil 
company in order to diversify the Kingdom’s economy. When announced by Crown 
Prince and Chairman of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs Mohammad 
bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud this bold vision was mocked by critics as “pure 
fantasy” and by others as a “positive project” calling it “Obligation 2030.”201  
In what many call a surprise move, Canada accepts the U.S. position on a 
territorial claim in the Beaufort Sea ending the long-standing territorial dispute.202  The 
origin of the Beaufort Sea dispute dates back to the 1825 treaty between Russia and Great 
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Britain.203  Although the U.S. government acknowledged Canada’s sovereignty and use 
of this territory, the U.S. Senate is still unwilling to ratify UNCLOS, which would 
provide the U.S. a means of arbitration to settle disputes, issues, and misinterpretations 
and provide stability in the Arctic.   
The renaissance brought Europe out of the Middle Ages and into an era of 
discovery, exploration, growth in commerce, and other changes.204  The events unfolding 
here become the catalysis for a second renaissance, one not centered in Europe, but in the 
Arctic, bringing it out of the Ice Age into the modern era. As in the previous scenario, the 
U.S. remains on the sidelines.    
D. SCENARIO 3: SOCHI AGREEMENT 
Unlike the U.S., which borders two oceans and two allies, Russia borders Europe/
NATO to the west, its former satellite countries to the southwest, India/China/Japan to 
the south and east and until recently the frozen Arctic to the north.205  With the opening 
of the Arctic, Russia begins to pursue four national goals: “economics, security, 
transportation, and development.”206 
Russia’s development pursuit began in 2007 when Russia planted a flag on the 
seafloor at the North Pole causing a flurry of speculation and outcry.207  Russia has 
underway five major programs in the Arctic: build new and revitalize existing military 
bases, move troops into the region, build new icebreakers, invest in Arctic-optimized 
technology, and improve infrastructure to exploit natural resources.208  Russia continued 
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to test the West with its invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014. However, with a 
change in the U.S. administration, Russia switches from hard power to “soft or non-hard 
power instruments in the Arctic.”209  Russia’s advances in the Arctic continued in August 
2017 with Christophe de Margerie, a Russian owned ship carrying liquefied natural gas, 
making it through the Northern Sea Route without the aid of an icebreaker. Russia plans 
on building 15 more of these specialized tankers.210   
Russia seizes on America’s reluctance to engage the world community to include 
its closest neighbors, Canada and Mexico, with three unexpected coup d’état. First, it 
establishes a bilateral agreement with Canada. This agreement is mutually beneficial to 
Canada and Russia to resolve their territorial claims, allowing Canada to control the 
Northwest Passage and Russia the Northern Sea Route. Second, Russia circumvents the 
Arctic Council and United Nations and creates a new partnership consisting of Russia, 
Canada, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Singapore, and South Korea, known as the Sochi 
Agreement. The Sochi Agreement is Russia’s renewed attempt at unifying countries 
around its goals and away from the West, as it tried with the Warsaw Pact. This 
partnership is mutually beneficial to all in that Russia gains access to markets and 
technologies by providing needed sealift capabilities to their partners who see a greater 
benefit partnering with Russia than competing against it. Lastly, Russia relaxes its laws, 
which restricted public-private partnerships with Western governments and 
companies.211  Recognizing success in these actions, Russia alone and in combination 
with the Sochi Agreement engages the non-Arctic nations seeking additional partnerships 
that are advantageous for each other. 
The U.S. for its part continues to pursue policy choices inconsistent with the 
emergence of Russia’s new posture as depicted in this scenario.   
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E. SCENARIO 4: ARCTIC RUSSIAN BEAR 
The DOD underwent two strategic changes or offsets to win the Cold War. The 
first offset occurred in the 1950s, when the United States gained a strategic advantage 
over the Soviet Union by developing a nuclear arsenal to counter their numerical 
conventional advantage in Europe.212  Some twenty years later the Soviets closed the 
nuclear gap, requiring the U.S. to undergo a second offset–guided precision conventional 
weapons utilizing stealth, global positioning system and computer networks, all which 
made “accuracy independent of range.”213  Drawing from the U.S. success winning the 
first Cold War with superior technology despite a shrinking budget, Russia embarks on a 
similar plan for the Arctic. They do this with a robust plan to increase its Arctic military 
footprint and capabilities. This includes having a fleet of 55 icebreakers, building/
refurbishing nine Arctic military installations, training and equipping five Arctic 
Brigades, winterizing 25% of its conventional forces/equipment to allow it to operate in 
the Arctic, and conducting monthly live fire exercises involving all branches of its 
military services. As in the second scenario, Russia defends the build-up citing long 
overdue modernization of its arctic forces required to achieve their four national goals. 
Others view Russia’s Arctic plan as an extension of their regional conflicts in Crimea, 
Syria, and Africa. 
Although the NATO and others acknowledge this build-up, no country is in a 
position to match it. Decision makers deemed the Arctic low threat when faced with more 
pressing security issues namely persistent cyberattacks, homegrown violent extremism, 
and pandemic infections. Despite some uncertainty, scientific forecasts indicate, at least 
through 2050, a continual warming in the Arctic resulting in less sea ice and lessening the 
need for icebreakers and other specialized equipment. These predictions hold until 2025 
when the Arctic slowly returns to seasonal freeze/thaw levels seen in the 1970s. 
However, it will take 10 years or longer before perennial (multiyear) ice returns to the 
                                                 
212 Van Jackson, “The Pentagon’s Third Offset Strategy: What US Allies and Partners Need to 
Know,” The Diplomat, April 28, 2015, accessed July 15, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/the-
pentagons-third-offset-strategy-what-us-allies-and-partners-need-to-know.  
213 Shawn Brimley, “Offset Strategies & Warfighting Regimes,” War on the Rocks, October 15, 2014, 
accessed July 15, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2014/10/offset-strategies-warfighting-regimes/. 
 68
Arctic, requiring icebreakers or other ice handed vessels in order to transit the Arctic 
shipping routes. These changes happened because of three changes: developed countries 
assisting developing countries lowering their greenhouse gases, an increase use of 
alternative fuels in autos and breakthroughs in green energy production. 
Russia takes advantage of the West’s complacency toward the Arctic with a series 
of provocative steps. The Russian Navy begins to reposition several of its icebreakers and 
Arctic capable warships in what analysts believe is an attempt to blockade the Bering 
Strait, which would create another Ice Curtain in the Arctic.214  If successful, the 
blockade would stop all maritime traffic moving through the Arctic via the NSR, NWP, 
and TSR and could bring about a massive rescue and humanitarian mission, as the 
blockade would strand several cruise ships and numerous commercial fishing vessels. 
Peterson in his work suggests a Russian arctic blockade is a precursor to hostilities by 
preventing enemy forces access into or out of the Arctic.215  As of now, U.S. intelligence 
agencies are uncertain of Russia’s intent.          
In 2022, in response to numerous state sponsored/supported cyberattacks, the UN 
expands the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ’s) jurisdiction to include state 
sponsored/supported cyberattacks. Russia’s economy is feeling the effects of the ICJ 
imposed sanctions—high employment, lower life expectancy, and technologically trailing 
other developed countries.216  Should Russia succeed in getting the blockade in place, 
analysts believe Russia will expand its oil and mineral exploration beyond their EEZ, in 
areas previous declared by the UN not part of Russia’s EEZ and therefore off-limits for 
oil and mineral exploration/extraction.   
While many of the U.S. partnerships remain–NATO, Arctic Council, bilateral 
defense agreements between the United States and Japan, Korea, Australia and New 
Zealand–economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure by these are unable to persuade 
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Russia to abandon its actions or begin negotiations towards a mutually benefiting 
solution. Without firing a shot, launching a missile, or invading another country, Russia 
could hold the world at risk in an area none are prepared to venture.  
F. SUMMARY 
These scenarios present policymakers four alternate futures where Russia’s 
actions either hold the world at risk (adversary role) or begins to aligns itself with other 
nations in first-of-its-kind relationships (partner role). At the same, we can see the impact 
the melting sea ice has on their and other nations actions. The next chapter will consider 
the risks, costs, and benefits of the U.S. pursuing the strategic patience and persistence 
strategy on its ability to protect its national security interest, the homeland and ensure 
freedom of the seas. 
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VI. FINDINGS 
The four scenarios narrated in the previous chapter are not predictions or forecasts 
about the future; rather they explore the problem space in order to prepare policy makers 
for specific “decision-focused” views of the future.217  The four scenarios present 
challenges and opportunities for the national goals for the Arctic and reflect what James 
Schlesinger postulated shortly after the end of the Cold War: 
[I]n the Cold War the United States rose to the challenge. It persevered. It 
stayed the course.  …  But the Cold War was unique. There was a clear 
and present danger – an unequivocal threat that sustained the attention and 
the support of the American people.  …  Our permanent interests are less 
clearly defined and more difficult to discern. … Can we stay the course in 
this new context of foreign policy?  Only if we are sufficiently disciplined 
to select those tasks, few in number, that truly involve the longer-term 
interests of this society -- and avoid becoming sidetracked by the many 
lesser tasks (brought to our attention by an enterprising news industry) that 
would exhaust the patience of the America public.218 
A. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE STRATEGIC PATIENCE AND 
PERSISTENCE STRATEGY 
In evaluating the effectiveness of the strategic patience and persistence strategy to 
achieve the U.S. three Arctic goals: protect its national security interest, the homeland 
and ensure freedom of the seas; I will use three categories: costs, risks, and benefits. 
Costs include more than annual expenditures by various levels of government toward 
homeland security but also non-tangible items. Such as the political, military, and 
diplomatic costs to U.S. standing in the world as it pursues a wait-and-see approach to the 
Arctic. Risks are the unintended consequences utilizing strategic patience and persistence 
strategy in achieving the national Arctic goals. Finally, benefits are an assessment of 
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whether the strategic patience and persistence strategy meets the U.S. Arctic goals in 
each scenario.219  Table 7 provides a summary of the findings. 
                                                 
219 John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland 
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Table 7.   Summary of findings 
Criteria Scenarios 
 New Spice Route Arctic Renaissance Sochi Agreement Arctic Russian Bear 
Costs 
 
In terms of money, this option 
costs the U.S. nothing. Scenario 
could diminish the U.S. standing 
in innovation, business, and 
leadership. 
In terms of money, this 
option costs the U.S. 
nothing. U.S. diplomatic 
inaction may cause other 
countries to resolve 
disputes less favorable for 
the U.S. U.S. portrayed as 
unwilling to negotiate on 
seemingly minor disputes. 
In terms of money, this option 
costs the U.S. nothing. However, 
U.S. standing in the world 
diminished as Russia takes the 
lead on diplomatic negotiations 
unifying disparate countries to 
common Arctic goals and 
objectives.  
In terms of money, this 
option costs the U.S. 
nothing. However, this may 
prevent the U.S. to achieve 
its three Arctic goals.   
Risks Scenario poses little threat to the 
U.S. three Arctic goals; could 
hurt standing in the world. 
Failure by U.S. to develop 
infrastructure could leave it 
vulnerable, i.e., limited deep-
water ports, airfields, etc. 
Russian investment has potential 
for dual use, civilian and 
military, the U.S. has limited 
response options for latter.   
Scenario poses limited risk 
to the U.S. achieving its 
three Arctic goals. Russia’s 
modernizing its Arctic 
capabilities, while 
reasonable given its age, 
poses the risk of dual use, 
which no one nation or 
coalition of nations can 
respond to. 
U.S. may find itself further 
behind the world with respect to 
its Arctic capabilities. As a non-
signatory of the Agreement 
effects on the U.S. could be 
similar to UNCLOS, where the 
U.S. finds itself on the outside.   
Russia blockades the Arctic 
in order to maintain military 
security and drills in waters 
outside their EEZ, however, 
the chance of this scenario 
playing out is considered 
very unlikely (<10%). The 
U.S. is dependent on other 
nations for its Arctic 
security. 
Benefits Russia, China and others 
investments in the Arctic allows 
the U.S. to address more serious 
homeland security issues 
affecting the nation. These 
countries make the big upfront 
investments in the Arctic; the 
U.S. can learn and invest at a 
time of its choosing, learning 
from their missteps and achieve 
similar results for less money. 
U.S. achieves its three 
Arctic goals without major 
investments in the Arctic. 
Allows the U.S. to focus on 
more pressing issues. 
U.S. achieves it three Arctic 
goals and as in the other 
scenarios, allows the U.S. to 
focus on other issues–homeland 
security, infrastructure, etc. 
Should this scenario play 
out, this could revitalize U.S. 
defense industry as it 
develops Arctic capabilities 
to respond to this crisis. 
Until such time, the U.S. can 
focus on other issues.   
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1. New Spice Route Outcome 
This scenario along with the next two is the most promising for the U.S. to 
achieve its three Arctic goals. From a monetary perspective, the U.S. expends nothing in 
the way of public or private funds. Russian, Chinese, and European companies, backed 
by their governments, explore new ventures in the Arctic–a big risk, which could yield an 
even bigger benefit. On the surface, Russia’s assistance with getting goods through the 
Arctic appears as a win-win for them, and businesses and consumers of those goods. 
However, if the U.S. does not develop or expand its Arctic capabilities and infrastructure, 
Russia’s initiative in the Arctic, could potentially lead to Russia supporting cargo 
movement to countries favorable to it while forcing others to seek alternate more costly 
routes. 
Similarly, the Russia-China floating island city agreement is a win for everyone 
using the Arctic and costs the United States nothing. While international Search and 
Rescue agreements require vessels to respond to those in distress, the Arctic’s vast 
distances, harsh environment, and limited communication and infrastructure makes these 
challenging if not impossible operations. Denmark and Canada’s economy and citizens 
depend in part on the Arctic; both countries see great potential and benefit from these 
floating islands. This good can quickly become a threat to the U.S. should Russia decide 
to militarize their floating island cities. Should this happen, the U.S. response options are 
limited and it will seriously jeopardize its ability to protect its national interest and ensure 
freedom of the seas.  
The biogas movement is a win for energy development, energy security, and the 
environment. Instead of viewing the release of methane gas into the environment as a fait 
accompli with no viable solution, others took up the challenge and found a way to 
harness this energy source. As in the two previous areas, this comes at no cost to the U.S.  
however, it puts the country’s energy program and indirectly the nation’s national 
interests at risk due to its limited energy diversity as well as lower gas prices that could 
influence gas fracking. Globally, this could slow the transition to renewable energy as 
lower gas prices make gas a cheaper option than renewable energy.       
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A benefit to inaction by the U.S. is it allows others to address these issues to 
include homeland security concern. While the U.S. citizens may remain safe, avoiding 
costly technologies and capabilities with limited applications could hurt the U.S. in other 
ways. Viewed today as the world’s leader in innovation, leadership and solving hard 
problems (e.g., putting a man on the moon), avoiding the Arctic because it is too costly, 
too far, not an issue for the lower 48 states puts all of this into jeopardy.        
2. Arctic Renaissance Outcome 
Although this scenario allows the U.S. to achieve its three Arctic goals, it comes 
with a certain amount of risks. Russia’s reasons for modernizing its Arctic capabilities 
and infrastructure on the surface seem reasonable, however, no one country or coalition 
of countries is able to match Russia’s Arctic capabilities should their motives turn from 
peaceful to confrontational and hinder freedom of the seas. 
The U.N. rejection of Russia’s territorial claims on the one hand is good for the 
environment as it limits Arctic exploration and the potential for catastrophic disaster 
should an oil spill occur in the Arctic. However, will there come a time when Russia 
ignores the U.N. ruling and begins exploration in non-EEZ waters?  Would this cause its 
partner companies to back out of their drilling and mining agreements siding with the 
U.N. ruling and maintaining the rule-of-law over profits?  What if any retaliatory actions 
would Russia take against these companies and their governments? 
Canada’s unilateral acceptance of the U.S. position on the Beaufort Sea is in the 
eyes of most experts as more beneficial to the U.S. That said, Canada does not come 
away empty handed, but can at its time and choosing start mining and drilling in this 
previously disputed area. The U.S. has territorial disputes involving The Bahamas, 
Marshall Islands, Russia, and Cuba who may follow Canada’s lead and accede to the U.S. 
position in order to move forward with their national plans and not wait for the U.S. to 
come to the negotiation table to hammer out an agreeable solution.220 
                                                 
220 CIA, “Field Listing – Disputes – International,” The World Factbook, accessed November 20, 
2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2070.html. 
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As in the first scenario, the costs associated with this scenario are not monetary, 
but rather to U.S. credibility and willingness to compromise and work with other nations 
on reaching a mutually beneficial solution. The scenario leverages cooperation and trust 
not conflict and doubt. This level of trust and cooperation is nothing new. Following the 
end of the Cold War, 34 countries signed onto the Open Skies Treaty considered the 
“most wide-ranging international arms control efforts to date to promote openness and 
transparency in military forces and activities.”221  The Open Skies Treaty is a low cost, 
low risk treaty with high benefits. Russia views the Arctic as a region with great strategic 
importance and this scenario gets them out in front of the U.S. bringing with them others 
interested in the region but unable to do so with their limited resources. 
3. Sochi Agreement Outcome 
The monetary costs for this scenario are negligible; however, this scenario is not 
without its costs. Russia’s ability to broker this agreement between Arctic and non-Arctic 
countries reflects Russia’s political influence to unite disparate countries around their 
interests for the Arctic versus the U.S. or those of the Arctic Council. If this Agreement 
proves successful, other countries will certainly sign on to it, creating what Espen Barth 
Eide warned about, others starting their own club.222  The Warsaw Pact was an attempt 
by the then former Soviet Union to control Central and Eastern Europe following War 
World II from 1954 to 1991. Russia’s attempt to control the Arctic could have worldwide 
implications, should it impose heavy tolls, fees, or restrictions for transit through the 
Arctic by non-Sochi members. The latter could prevent the U.S. from ensuring freedom 
of the seas. 
Impacts to national interests and protecting the homeland are minimal for this 
scenario. Six countries joined Russia to form this Agreement, which focuses on 
exclusively on the Arctic. In the future, other countries may join this Agreement, but 
again the focus is on Arctic specific issues–trade, commerce, development, etc. It is 
                                                 
221 U.S. Department of State, “Treaty on Open Skies,” accessed October 29, 2017, 
https://www.state.gov/t/avc/cca/os/index.htm. 
222 Morten Brugård, “Norway says yes to China in Arctic Council.” 
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common for countries to sign on to regional agreements in order to advance their goals 
and aims some include: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, European Union, 
African Union, or Organization of American States. Still others sign on to specific issue 
such Paris Agreement (Climate), Ottawa Treaty (Anti-personnel mines), Geneva 
Conventions (treatment during armed conflict), and others. Should Russia’s actions turn 
from one of cooperation to hostility, signatories of the Sochi Agreement are likely to 
suspend their Sochi obligations in order to maintain a peaceful Arctic.   
Russia’s pursuits in the Arctic outpace all other Arctic nations combined in size 
and scope. This scenario suggests now is the time for the U.S. to start revitalizing its 
Arctic capabilities and infrastructure. This is especially true given the long lead-time to 
develop and build in the Arctic. I would argue these projects need not be on the scale and 
scope of the five Russia has underway, but substantial to convey a strategic message to 
Russia and the world on the U.S. interests to maintain a peaceful Arctic.              
4. Arctic Russian Bear Outcome 
Of the four scenarios, this scenario poses the greatest danger to the United States 
driven by three factors–decision, indecision, and misinterpretation. Decisions made by 
the United States to focus on more pressing threats, while at the time provided the 
greatest benefit with minimal risk, created vulnerabilities in the Arctic. Indecision by 
policymakers for failing to call Russia’s bluff earlier or thinking action by U.S. will make 
a bad situation worse. Finally, U.S. decision makers’ misinterpretation of Russia’s true 
intentions by failing to recognize or refusing to believe the facts and their strategic 
importance.223  As in the previous scenarios, the monetary costs to do nothing are 
negligible, but doing so negatively affects the United States’ three national Arctic goals.   
The U.S. strategic and conventional forces have protected its citizens, homeland, 
and national security interests. However, as this scenario unfolds, the U.S. and its allies 
have limited military options to counter Russia’s Arctic blockade and any follow-on 
actions they may pursue. As depicted in the scenario, economic sanctions have limited 
                                                 
223 Peterson, Soviet Military Objectives in the Arctic Theater and How They Might Be Obtained, 18-
22. 
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impact given Russia’s current econoic situation and diplomatic sanctions would play well 
in the press, but again with little or no affect to alter Russia’s strategic plan.     
Should the blockage materialize, freedom of the sea through the Arctic is 
impossible without military or diplomatic action. On both of these, the U.S. lacks an 
effective means to alter Russia’s plans. Militarily, the U.S. has limited forces and 
equipment to operate in the Arctic and respond appropriately to Russia’s blockade. 
Although the U.S. could appeal to the United Nations, expel Russian diplomats, and 
enact other diplomatic measures, without knowing Russia’s intentions, these actions seem 
counterproductive and could extend rather than resolve the current situation. While it 
may seem an unlikely scenario, could the Arctic turn into another Ukraine or Syria, 
where Russia exploits the U.S. Arctic policy and finds itself “one step ahead of the 
West”?224  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The Arctic presents the U.S. with many challenges and opportunities. One might 
call the strategic patience and persistence strategy, a strategy of restraint. The challenge is 
not always rushing in to the sound of guns, but rather waiting until the conditions are 
right for action. An opportunity for the U.S. to “recognize its limitations, conserve 
resources” and encourage “cooperative security” by allowing its allies to perform a 
greater role in their security.225           
                                                 
224 Sergunin, “Is Russia Going Hard or Soft in the Arctic” and David J. Kramer, “U.S. foreign policy 
comes home to roost with Russia’s action in Ukraine,” Washington Post, March 1, 2014, accessed October 
29, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-foreign-comes-home-to-roost-with-russias-action-
in-ukraine/2014/03/01/10be38bc-a18d-11e3-b8d8-94577ff66b28_story.html?utm_term=.dd24175d114f; 
Martin Hurt, “Preempting Further Russian Aggression Against Europe: Acceptance of Russia's aggression 
in Europe will only invite more,” 2016 Index of Military Strength, accessed November 24, 2017, 
http://index.heritage.org/military/2016/essays/preempting-further-russian-aggression/. 
225 Barry R. Posen, “A New U.S. Grand Strategy,” Boston Review, July 1, 2014, accessed November 
6, 2017, http://bostonreview.net/us/barry-r-posen-restraint-grand-strategy-united-states. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. WRAP-UP  
Western strategists regarded the Arctic, as the “fourth wall” which enclosed 
Russia to the north and until recently believed containing Russia rested on geography and 
political power.226  Russia viewed this not a wall to contain it, but one to overcome using 
technology (a fleet of icebreakers), economics (a pipeline from Siberia to Western 
Europe), changing climate (inaccessible regions available for human development), and 
evolving international laws (UNLCOS ratified in 1982, Arctic Council established in 
1996, Ilulissat Declaration passed in 2008, and makes progress on the maritime dispute 
with Norway).227    
Today, the West views the melting Arctic sea ice with one eye on its risks and the 
other on its rewards. The risks entail impacts to the environment, indigenous people, and 
the climate. The rewards are quicker shipping routes, new areas for offshore oil and gas, 
natural resource development, tourism, and more, albeit private rewards winning out over 
social costs. Russia sees this as an opportunity to pivot away from Central Asia where it 
lost its foothold with the fall of the Iron Curtain and pursue a new course in the Arctic 
centered on four factors: foreign policy, military security, economic development, and 
transportation and maritime policy.228 
Scientists with a very high level of confidence predict “an Arctic-wide ice loss is 
expected to continue through the 21st century, very likely (>90%) resulting in nearly sea 
ice-free late summers by the 2040s.”229  At the same time, others are calling on the 
USCG to buy four heavy icebreakers, with an average cost of $791 million and lifetime 
                                                 
226 Antrim, “The Russian Arctic in the Twenty-First Century,” 110. 
227 Ibid., 116-119; Ilulissat Declaration commits the five Arctic coastal countries (Canada, Norway, 
Denmark, Russia and the U.S.) to resolve issues through diplomatic means. 
228 Antrim, “The Russian Arctic in the Twenty-First Century,” 120-124. 
229 Taylor, P.C., W. Maslowski, J. Perlwitz, and D.J. Wuebbles, 2017: Arctic Changes and their 
Effects on Alaska and the Rest of the United States, 303; “Very high level of confidence” is defined as 
“Strong evidence (established theory, multiple sources, consistent results, well documented and accepted 
methods, etc.), high consensus.” 
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costs in excess of $6.5 billion, in lieu of three heavy and three medium icebreakers given 
our restrained budget environment.230  Given these and other uncertainties, the strategic 
patience and persistence strategy is a viable approach to pursue in the Arctic, which 
allows the U.S. to achieve its three national Arctic goals.    
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS  
One of the key aspects to using scenarios is to identify signposts–external 
warnings or precursors–indicating a scenario becoming a reality.231  The challenge within 
the Homeland Security and Defense realm is sorting through the immensity of data, 
evaluating its trustworthiness, and identifying its tipping point.  
The signposts are in place for the New Silk Road as seen by the increase in 
maritime traffic through the Arctic. Policymakers need to ensure safe passage with 
minimal impact to the environment and indigenous people and to keep the Arctic arms 
free. The Arctic Renaissance signposts will be evident should Russia continue to expand 
its arctic capabilities, especially as the rate of melting Arctic ice increases. Their energy 
development initiatives within their EEZ will also be evident. Both would provide the 
U.S. an opportunity to collaborate instead of compete with Russia. The Sochi Agreement 
reflects a business practice of seeking a partner beneficial to all parties involved, resulting 
in a win-in-win for all parties. In this scenario, while the United States is on the sidelines, 
it should remain vigilant for unusual partnerships. Why is Russia reaching out to a long-
standing adversary?  Why would Canada and others agree to cooperate with the 
Russian’s now, what can they gain from this agreement?  While the United States may 
continue to hold fast remaining on the sidelines, it is in these nascent moments when U.S. 
policymakers should begin to question their hands-off policy and weigh the risks/benefits 
of joining these partnerships. Finally, the cost, lead-time, and uncertainty of the Arctic 
Russian Bear would require the United States to consider all facets of its decisions and 
                                                 
230 Ben Werner, “Report: Coast Guard Should Focus on Buying Heavy Icebreakers,” USNI News, 
November 20, 2017, accessed November 25, 2017, https://news.usni.org/2017/11/20/report-coast-guard-
focus-heavy-icebreakers; National Academy of Science, Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: 
Fulfilling the Nation’s Needs (Washington, DC: The National Academy Press, 2017), DOI 
10.17226/24834.  
231 Ralston and Wilson, The Scenario-Planning Handbook,167-168.  
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not just costs. In many ways, this is akin to the calculus undertaken today regarding 
actions against North Korea–are there any good options?  A signpost U.S. policymakers 
should consider is using matching versus choice for their decisions: “at what price do 
other options become more attractive” versus “why should we do this?”232 
Based on my analysis, U.S. policymakers should look for a few key low cost 
initiatives to operationalize the strategic patience and persistence strategy by doing the 
following: 
 Make a small investment now in the Arctic, which would provide the U.S. 
a forward operating location (base or deep-water port) to respond to an 
accident or incident in the Arctic or deploy forces to counter Russia 
aggression.   
 Build three deep-water ports in the Arctic in collaboration with Norway 
and Canada in order to improve its situational awareness on actions taking 
place in the Arctic, especially by Russia. 
 Extend the service life of the remaining icebreakers to 2040 in lieu of 
building new medium and/or heavy icebreakers. By 2040, icebreakers 
should no longer be needed in the Arctic.   
 Amend the Jones Act for the Arctic to allow non-US owned and operated 
ships to transport goods between U.S. ports through the Arctic. If 
successful, then the U.S. should collaborate with other Arctic nations who 
own and operate modern icebreakers (with less crew, lower carbon 
footprint, etc.) and newer ships capable of transitioning the Arctic without 
the need for an icebreaker escort. 
 Ratify UNCLOS and pursue other diplomatic actions to solidify the U.S. 
relations with our key Arctic and non-Arctic partners. 
 Build upon the limited exercises taking place in the Arctic–ICEX, Arctic 
Chinook, and others–in order to prepare the various Federal Departments 
and Agencies to respond to emerging issues (oil spill, stranded tourist 
vessel, blockade, treaty violation, etc.).  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH / OPEN QUESTIONS 
While the Arctic may remain an area of little conflict or of homeland security 
concerns for policymakers, nonetheless, the method used in this thesis could assist them 
                                                 
232 Bradley DeWess, “What should we about North Korea? We may be thinking about it all wrong,” 
Washington Post, September 10, 2017, B3. 
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in evaluating future policy decisions by exploring potential future scenarios versus 
predicting the future using traditional forecast tools and models. Researchers should 
consider using scenarios as a methodology as an alternative to the typical decision 
making process: define/analyze the problem, develop courses of actions (COA), analyze 
advantages/disadvantages, select the best COA, implement, test, and follow-up.233   
In general, when there is a lot of uncertainty, as there is in the Arctic, low cost 
options are the best way to go. One keeps nearly all their powder dry and invests in a few 
selective projects that may yield many options or specific projects to protect the U.S. 
national goals. What are some projects in which the U.S. should invest, either alone, with 
a partner nation, or private entity? 
For what others areas of national security should the U.S. adapt the strategic 
patience and persistence strategy–addressing pandemic diseases, monitoring  and tracking 
all vessels (ships, trains, trucks) carrying hazardous cargo, conducting TSA-like 
screenings for commercial trains and buses?   
Finally, an important area for research would be understanding what factors are 
the most important triggers to move policymakers out of strategic patience and 
persistence strategy to an active posture in the Arctic. What are the key signals U.S. 
policymakers should look for and what active steps should they pursue?   
 
                                                 
233 Marjolein B.A. van Asselt, et al, Foresight in Action – Developing Policy-Oriented Scenarios, 22-
24. 
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APPENDIX A.  LIST OF NATIONAL ARCTIC POLICIES 
1994 Presidential 
Decision Directive/NSC-
26–United States Policy 
on the Arctic and 
Antarctic Regions 




Arctic Region Policy 
2010 National Security 
Strategy 
2015 National Security 
Strategy 
2013 National Strategy 
for the Arctic Region–
Lines of Effort (LOEs) 1 
and 3 apply to this 
thesis 
Meeting post-Cold War 
national security and 
defense needs 
Meet national security and 
homeland security needs 
relevant to the Arctic 
region 
The United States is an 
Arctic Nation with broad 
and fundamental interests 
in the Arctic region, where 
we seek to meet our 
national security needs, 
protect the environment, 
responsibly manage 
resources, account for 
indigenous communities, 
support scientific research, 
and strengthen 
international cooperation 
on a wide range of issues. 
Confronting Climate 
Change: The present day 
effects of climate change 
are being felt from the 
Arctic to the Midwest. 
LOE 1: Advance U.S. 
Security Interests 
 Evolve Arctic 
Infrastructure and 
Strategic Capabilities  
 Enhance Arctic 
Domain Awareness  
 Preserve Arctic 
Region Freedom of 
the Seas  
 Provide for Future 
United States Energy 
Security  
 
Protecting the Arctic 
environment and 
conserving its biological 
resources 
Protect the Arctic 
environment and conserve 
its biological resources 
 Air and Maritime 
Security: [W]e seek to 
build on the unprecedented 
international cooperation 
of the last few years, 
especially in the Arctic as 
well as in combatting 
piracy off the Horn of 
Africa and drug-smuggling 
in the Caribbean Sea and 
across Southeast Asia 
LOE 3: Strengthen 
International Cooperation 
 Pursue Arrangements 
that Promote Shared 
Arctic State 
Prosperity, Protect the 
Arctic Environment, 
and Enhance Security 
 Accede to the Law of 




26–United States Policy 
on the Arctic and 
Antarctic Regions 




Arctic Region Policy 
2010 National Security 
Strategy 
2015 National Security 
Strategy 
2013 National Strategy 
for the Arctic Region–
Lines of Effort (LOEs) 1 
and 3 apply to this 
thesis 
and Related Affairs  
 
Assuring that natural 
resource management and 
economic development in 
the region are 
environmentally 
sustainable 
Ensure that natural 
resource management and 
economic development in 
the region are 
environmentally 
sustainable 
 Advance our Energy 
Security: We will also 
stay engaged with global 
suppliers and our partners 
to reduce the potential for 
energy-related conflict in 




for cooperation among the 
eight Arctic nations 
Strengthen institutions for 
cooperation among the 
eight Arctic nations (the 
United States, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, the Russian 
Federation, and Sweden) 
   
Involving the Arctic’s 
indigenous peoples in 
decisions that affect them 
Involve the Arctic’s 
indigenous communities in 
decisions that affect them 
   
Enhancing scientific 
monitoring and research 




monitoring and research 
into local, regional, and 
global environmental 
issues 
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APPENDIX B.  LINE OF EFFORT 1 AND SELECT PORTIONS OF 
LINE OF EFFORT 3 FROM IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK 
FOR THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION 
Line of Effort 1: Advance U.S. Security Interests 
 
Evolve Arctic Infrastructure and Strategic Capabilities  
 
1.1 Prepare for Increased Activity in the Maritime Domain  
 
Objective: Guide Federal activities related to the construction, maintenance, and 
improvement of ports and other infrastructure needed to preserve the mobility and safe 
navigation of United States military and civilian vessels throughout the Arctic region.  
 
Next Steps: Create a coordinated approach toward improving and maintaining infrastructure 
in support of Federal maritime Arctic activities prioritized in consideration of national 
security, navigation safety, and stewardship of national resources. This coordinated approach 
will include:  
 
1.1.1 Deliver a 10–year prioritization framework to coordinate the phased 
development of Federal infrastructure identified through a Department and Agency validated 
needs assessment by the end of 2016. Lead: Department of Transportation (as Chair of 
the Committee on the Marine Transportation System)  
 
1.1.2 Develop recommendations for pursuing Federal public–private partnerships in 
support  of the needs assessment and identified prioritized activities by the end of 2017. 
Lead: Department of Transportation (as Chair of the Committee on the Marine 
Transportation System)  
 
1.1.3 Evaluate the feasibility of deepening and extending harbor capabilities in Nome, 
Alaska, and if the evaluation determines that navigation improvements are appropriate, begin 
planning efforts, including developing a construction timeline by 2020. Lead: Department 
of Defense (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) 
 
Supporting Agencies: Member departments and agencies of the Committee on the Marine 
Transportation System  
 
1.2 Sustain and Support Evolving Aviation Requirements  
 
Objective: Advance the stability, safety, and security of the aviation environment in the U.S. 
Arctic region.  
 
Next Steps: The following deliverables will be pursued in accordance with the Federal 
Aviation Administration’s baseline schedules and capital investment plan and through 
partnering with the State of Alaska:  
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1.2.1 Complete Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS–B) ground 
station deployments by the end of 2016. Lead: Department of Transportation (Federal 
Aviation Administration)  
 
1.2.2 Continue conducting Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) 
improvements, including scheduled geo–satellite updates. Lead: Department of 
Transportation (Federal Aviation Administration)  
 
1.2.3 Continue to coordinate with the State of Alaska to assess existing infrastructure, 
maintenance requirements, and navigational systems, and to identify opportunities to enhance 
safety and security including in rural or remote areas. Lead: Department of Transportation 
(Federal Aviation Administration)  
 
Supporting Agencies: Department of Agriculture (Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service), Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of the 
Interior  
 
1.3 Develop Communication Infrastructure in the Arctic  
 
Objective: Support improvement to the telecommunication infrastructure and the use of new 
technology to improve communications in the region, including in areas of sparse population 
to facilitate emergency response.  
 
Next Steps: The following deliverables will be pursued in coordination with the State of 
Alaska and Tribal communities in support of the National Strategy for the Arctic Region:  
 
1.3.1 Create comprehensive assessment of the current and near–term communications 
needs of each key user group in Arctic Alaska, including: local communities; science; 
maritime; oil and gas; aeronautical; surveillance (weather/seismic); search and rescue; and 
other public/government service by end of 2016. Lead: Department of Commerce 
(National Telecommunications and Information Administration) 
 
1.3.2 Develop a framework that lists and prioritizes opportunities for investments in 
telecommunications capacity and capability, with a strong emphasis on innovative 
technologies with Federal, State, Tribal, and international public–private partnerships by the 
end of 2017 that meets expected communications needs of key user groups in Arctic Alaska. 
Lead: Department of Commerce (National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration)  
 
Supporting Agencies: Denali Commission, Department of Agriculture, Department of 
Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), Department of Defense, 
Department of Homeland Security (U.S. Coast Guard), Department of the Interior, 
Department of State, Department of Transportation, Federal Communications Commission, 





Enhance Arctic Domain Awareness  
 
1.4 Enhance Arctic Domain Awareness  
 
Objective: Increase Arctic domain awareness, with specific emphasis on Arctic maritime 
domain awareness, by improving appropriate capabilities to collect and exchange information 
by leveraging partnerships with all entities operating in the Arctic, including Federal, State, 
local, tribal, research, academia, industry, and international entities.  
 
Next Steps: The following deliverables will be pursued in support of increasing Arctic 
domain awareness through the leveraging of partnerships:  
 
1.4.1 Work with academia and industry to evaluate the costs and benefits of 
Unmanned Systems in the Arctic to collect ship tracking, meteorological, oil spill, and 
hydrographic data. Lead: Department of Homeland Security (U.S. Coast Guard)  
 
1.4.2 Evaluate the feasibility of using Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to improve 
observational ability in the Arctic in coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration’s 
ongoing efforts to safely integrate UAS into the national airspace system by the end of 2017 
as defined in the UAS Comprehensive Plan. Lead: Department of Homeland Security 
(U.S. Coast Guard)  
 
1.4.3 Continue to work with international partners toward enhancing Long Range 
Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system capability, including for the Arctic region. Publish 
a report by the end of 2017 which assesses progress on the use of LRIT to support increased 
Arctic awareness and navigational safety. Lead: Department of Homeland Security (U.S. 
Coast Guard) 
 
1.4.4 Leverage relationships with international partners to improve national capacity 
to communicate and collect environmental data by satellite. Publish an assessment of current 
partnerships and capabilities with recommendations by the end of 2016. Lead: Department 
of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration)  
 
1.4.5 Leverage the Maritime Information Sharing Environment, developed as part of 
the National Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture, to develop the capability to receive 
information from diverse sources, analyze the information, and disseminate it to stakeholders. 
Publish a plan to establish a mechanism for information sharing for the Arctic by the end of 
2017. Lead: Department of Homeland Security (U.S. Coast Guard)  
 
1.4.6 Develop a timeline to enhance shared situational awareness across Federal, 
State, local, tribal, industry, non–governmental organizations, and international partners 
through broadly accessible enterprise information services, standardized information formats, 
and common data standards by the end of 2016. Lead: Department of Homeland Security 
(U.S. Coast Guard)  
 
1.4.7 Evaluate space–based observation capabilities through participation in 
scheduled and future pilot programs to evaluate the feasibility of using space–based data and 
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publish results by the end of 2016. Lead: Department of Defense (National Geospatial–
Intelligence Agency)  
 
1.4.8 Enhance Automatic Identification System (AIS) capabilities, in alignment with 
current regulations, to facilitate identification and tracking of maritime assets across the 
Arctic region by the end of 2018. Lead: Department of Homeland Security (U.S. Coast 
Guard)  
 
1.4.9 Participate in discussions focusing on Arctic information and data requirements 
through a variety of fora, including the navigation services community, to leverage multi–
national and multi–agency capabilities. Lead: Department of Homeland Security (U.S. 
Coast Guard)  
 
1.4.10 Increase understanding of potential threats to national security interests in the 
U.S. Arctic region and raise awareness of available safeguards through public–private 
partnerships, industry liaison platforms, and information sharing initiatives with Federal, 
state, local, and Tribal stakeholders. Lead: Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation)  
 
1.4.11 Collaborate with industry, academia and government entities to identify 
vulnerable critical infrastructure, sensitive information and technologies, and to lead efforts 
to prevent loss or exploitation. Lead: Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation)  
 
Supporting Agencies: Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration), Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security (U.S. Coast 
Guard), Department of State, Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation 
Administration), National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and National Maritime 
Intelligence–Integration Office  
 
Preserve Arctic Region Freedom of the Seas  
 
1.5 Sustain Federal Capability to Conduct Maritime Operations in Ice–
Impacted Waters  
 
Objective: Ensure the United States maintains ice–breaking ship capability with sufficient 
capacity to assure Arctic maritime access, support U.S. interests in the Polar Regions, and 
facilitate research that advances the fundamental understanding of the Arctic.  
 
Next Steps: Develop long–term plans to sustain Federal capability to physically access the 
Arctic with sufficient capacity to support U.S. interests in the Arctic. Next steps include:  
 
1.5.1 Finalize operational requirements and accelerate the acquisition production 
activities of a new U.S. Coast Guard heavy icebreaker to begin production activities in 2020. 
Lead: Department of Homeland Security (U.S. Coast Guard)  
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1.5.2 Continue planning for construction of additional icebreakers to achieve a 
capacity for year–round access in the Arctic. Lead: Department of Homeland Security 
(U.S. Coast Guard)  
 
1.5.3 Submit funding plans for the icebreakers through the regular annual budget 
process. Lead: Department of Homeland Security (U.S. Coast Guard)  
 
Supporting Agencies: Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration), Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Transportation, 
and National Science Foundation  
 
1.6 Promote International Law and Freedom of the Seas  
 
Objective: The United States will continue to promote freedom of the seas and global 
mobility of maritime and aviation interests for all nations in accordance with international 
law. The United States will promote and conduct such activities in the Arctic region as 
appropriate. 
 
Next Steps: The United States will exercise internationally recognized navigation and 
overflight rights, including transit passage through international straits, innocent passage 
through territorial seas, and the conduct of routine operations on, over, and under foreign 
exclusive economic zones, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. Toward this end, 
the U.S. Government will, as appropriate:  
 
1.6.1 Conduct routine Arctic maritime exercises, operations, and transits consistent 
with international law. Lead: Department of Defense  
 
1.6.2 Document U.S. diplomatic communications in the Digest of U.S. Practice in 
International Law published by the Department of State. Lead: Department of State  
 
1.6.3 Document the Department of Defense report on fiscal year freedom of 
navigation operations and other related activities conducted by U.S. Armed Forces. Lead: 
Department of Defense  
 
1.6.4 Deliver strategic communications at appropriate opportunities to reflect U.S. 
objections to unlawful restrictions in the Arctic on the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea 
and airspace recognized under international law; and to promote the global mobility of 
vessels and aircraft throughout the Arctic region consistent with international law. Lead: 
Department of State  
 
Supporting Agencies: Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security (U.S. Coast 
Guard), and Department of State  
 
Provide for Future United States Energy Security  
 
1.7 Pursue the Development of Renewable Energy Resources  
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Objective: Promote development and deployment of available renewable energy resources in 
the U.S. Arctic region, such as wind, wave, and solar energy, to support local and regional 
energy security for remote Alaska communities and Federal facilities through collaboration 
with local and regional stakeholders, leveraging private sector investments, and exploring 
potential public–private partnerships.  
 
Next Steps: Explore and develop strategies to employ renewable energy resources to support 
energy development, energy security, and affordable energy reliability requirements of 
Federal, State, and Tribal entities through the following activities:  
 
1.7.1 Advance development and improvement of energy systems, such as the 
Department of Energy Alaska Strategic Technical Assistance Response Team (START) 
Program and the Department of the Interior Remote Community Renewable Energy 
Partnership, in remote Arctic communities by the end of 2018. Lead: Department of 
Energy  
 
1.7.2 Accelerate efforts by remote Alaskan communities to adopt sustainable energy 
strategies through execution of The Remote Alaskan Communities Energy Efficiency 
Competition by the end of 2019. Lead: Department of Energy  
 
1.7.3 Expand investment in climate solutions for remote Arctic communities through 
the Clean Energy Solutions for Remote Communities (CESRC) program by the end of 2016. 
Lead: White House Office of Science and Technology Policy  
 
1.7.4 Promote deployment of clean energy and energy efficiency projects for the 
installation of facility and community–scale clean energy and energy efficiency projects. 
Lead: Department of Energy  
 
1.7.5 Encourage private investment in renewable energy through facilitated 
workshops with community financing leaders, investors, and lending institutions (such as the 
2015 Solarize Alaska Project) to examine technology advancements, financing models and 
methods to leverage private investment. Leads: Department of Energy and Department of 
Agriculture  
 
1.7.6 Execute a Memorandum of Understanding with the Alaska Energy Authority to 
enhance new and existing energy systems in remote Alaska Native villages by the end of 
2016. Lead: Department of Energy  
 
1.7.7 Assist power providers in lowering energy costs for families and individuals 
within the Arctic region through programs like the competitive National Rural Utilities 
Service High Energy Cost grants and measuring results by the end of 2020. Lead: 
Department of Agriculture  
 
1.7.8 Support the improvement of electric infrastructure in rural and remote villages 
in the Arctic Alaska through the issuing of loans and grants (such as the Department of 
Agriculture Rural Utilities Service High Energy Cost grants) and measuring results. Leads: 
Department of Agriculture and Denali Commission  
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1.7.9 Facilitate and monitor bulk fuel facilities in the Arctic through grants provided 
by the Denali Commission in conjunction with the Trans–Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund. 
Lead: Denali Commission 
 
1.7.10 Conduct an analysis to evaluate the potential for net benefits of creating a 
National Arctic Energy policy to facilitate and advance National security, develop U.S. 
foreign policy, and meet regional and local energy needs. Lead: Department of Energy  
 
Supporting Agencies: Department of Agriculture, Department of Homeland Security, 
Department of the Interior, and National Science Foundation  
 
1.8 Ensure the Safe and Responsible Development of Non–Renewable Energy 
Resources  
 
Objective: Ensure safe and responsible exploration and development of onshore and offshore 
Arctic non–renewable energy resources in an environmentally sound manner.  
 
Next Steps: The development of all energy resources must be coupled with a coordinated 
responsible approach, domestically and internationally, which will be pursued through the 
following activities:  
 
1.8.1 Plan and conduct exploratory deep–water baseline benthic assessments. Lead: 
Department of the Interior (Bureau of Ocean Energy Management)  
 
1.8.2 Obtain and evaluate scientific and technical data to support the Targeted 
Leasing Approach for potential future offshore leasing. Lead: Department of the Interior 
(Bureau of Ocean Energy Management)  
 
1.8.3 Continue to encourage the development and improvement of technology to 
capture hydrocarbons in response to an oil spill, including the loss of well control. Lead: 
Department of the Interior (Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement)  
 
1.8.4 Evaluate and promote spill prevention technology involved in the drilling 
process, wellbore integrity, production operations, and final well plugging and abandonment. 
Lead: Department of the Interior  
 
Supporting Agencies: Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 





Line of Effort 3: Strengthen International 
Cooperation 
 
Pursue Arrangements that Promote Shared Arctic State 
Prosperity, Protect the Arctic Environment, and Enhance 
Security 
 
3.2 Enhance Arctic Search and Rescue  
 
Objective: Reduce risk, enhance international cooperation, and increase capacity with respect 
to Arctic search and rescue by implementing the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical 
and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic.  
 
Next Steps: Continue to strengthen search and rescue (SAR) preparedness efforts and support 
international SAR agreements relevant to the Arctic region. Next steps include:  
 
3.2.1 Lead an international Arctic SAR deployment exercise during the U.S. Arctic 
Council Chairmanship. Leads: Department of Homeland Security (U.S. Coast Guard), 
Department of Defense, and Department of State  
 
3.2.2 Develop a comprehensive understanding of national, state, regional, and, 
through Arctic Council coordination, international SAR resources potentially available in the 
region by the end of 2017. Lead: Department of Homeland Security (U.S. Coast Guard)  
 
Supporting Agencies: Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration), Department of Defense, Department of State, and Department of 
Transportation  
 
Accede to the Law of the Sea Convention and Related Affairs  
 
3.9 Accede to the Law of the Sea Convention  
 
Objective: Continue to seek the Senate’s advice and consent to accede to the Law of the Sea 
Convention.  
 
Next Step:  
 
3.9.1 Pursue accession to the Law of the Sea Convention and continue to seek Senate advice 
and consent to accession as a top Administration priority. Lead: Department of State  
 
Supporting Agencies: Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration), Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of 
the Interior, and Department of Transportation 
 
3.11 Resolve Beaufort Sea Maritime Boundary  
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Objective: Work toward a maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea that is agreed to by the 
United States and Canada.  
 
Next Steps: Assuming a willingness of the Canadian Government to pursue maritime 
boundary negotiations, next steps in this process include:  
 
3.11.1 Undertake careful legal and technical review of issues relating to a potential 
boundary agreement (on–going). Lead: Department of State  
 
3.11.2 Consult with State of Alaska and full range of other partners and stakeholders. 
Lead: Department of State  
 
3.11.3 Undertake bilateral technical work with Canada that would underpin a 
potential boundary agreement. Lead: Department of State  
 
3.11.4 Embark on negotiations with Canada on a potential boundary agreement. 
Lead: Department of State  
 
Supporting Agencies: Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
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